Identity and Experience_Hamilton_1996

2 Identity and Experience
To this end, my discussion of this khandha will be structured as follows. In
the first part of the chapter, the definitions of rEpa as given in the Sutta Waka
will be discussed, including a consideration of the terms 'primary' (no-updq
and 'secondary' (upida') as used in this context. The discussion will also
cover the so-called 'elements', the mahiibhiiti, as briefly referred to in the
Sutta @aka and more elaborately in later material. The second part of the
chapter will concentrate on a specific discussion concerning the senses.
Recognising their importance, the Theravada tradition as a whole (that is
the Abhidhamma, commentaries, Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga and the
writing of modern Theravada Buddhists) singles out the senses and their
corresponding objects (collectively referred to as eatanas) in defining the
'secondary' level of the riipamandha (which itself is not defined in the Sutta
Pitaka). In spite of this, the attempt here to gain a meaningful understanding
of the senses, has not been an easy one. As we shall see, even the
Abhidhamma is inconsistent in its descriptions. Though it defines them at
times as nipa, at other times it describes them in a way which suggests they
are not riipa. In the light of such ambiguity, I shall question just what it is
that is being referred to when the senses are mentioned in the Sutta Pitaka.
Not only do descriptions of each of the four ariipakkhandhas state that the
senses (or their objects) determine the different kinds of activity the Wlandha
represents, as I have said, but the senses are also one of the links in the
chain of the paticcmmupp2da formula which describes how the functioning
of a human being is dependently originated. I also referred in the
Introduction to passages which state that the ongoing existence of the individual,
his or her loka, is caused by desire based on the senses. The
Theravada Buddhist tradition, and many scholars of Buddhism, have
understood that where the senses are said to determine the different kinds
of activity of the ariipakkhandhas, they are the physical bases of the corresponding
mental activities. But I find this unsatisfactory: if the physical
sense organs are meant, one might expect them to be included in a description
of the riipakkhandha in the Sutta Pi!aka, particularly in view of the fact
that they are subsequently mentioned, but not classified, in the descriptions
of each of the ariipakkhandhas. I shall suggest a way they might be
understood to be neither riipa nor arzipa, thus explaining why they are not
included in the khandha analysis in the Sutta Pitaka.
In Buddhism, and in other Indian religions also, it is common that the
senses include the five which are common to us in Western culture and also
a sixth sense, manas, the corresponding object of which is dhammi. The term
manas literally means 'mind', and as such appears qualitatively different
from the other senses. Perhaps because of this, it remains uniquely ambiguous
as a sense, throughout the Pali material. Nor is it immediately obvious
what dhammi refers to. Neither is explained in the Sutta maka, but in the
Abhidhamma and commentaries they are classified as eatanas, a term which
covers all the senses and their objects (thus giving a total of twelve gatanas).