Identity and Experience_Hamilton_1996

The Rtipakkhandha
not intended to be a comprehensive classification. It describes the riipa and
arzipa aspects of the way an individual manifests which, when understood,
illustrates the inappropriateness of thinking in terms of separate selfhood:
not only is this clearly the didactic context in which they are frequently
referred to in the texts, but we have seen from our examination ofjust one
of the khandhas a manifest absence of any attempt to be descriptively
comprehensive. The senses themselves are not included in this analysis
because what is relevant about them is neither rzipa nor ariipa. But their
necessary role in the functioning of the human being is perhaps why they
are included in the paficcasarnuppida formula.
Notes
SN, Vol 111.
SN.III.86: K&a bhikkhave nipam vadetha? Ruizpatiti kho bhikkhave tasmii riipan ti vuccati. Kina
mjpati, sftcna pi ruppati u$ma pi mf@ati jghatchqa pi nrpiati piprSga pi Wati dawa-makasaviitiitapa-sin'wapa-~amphascnza
pi ruppati. Ruppatiti kho bhikWlave tasmii nipan ti vucciiti.
Wayman (1984, p.619) discusses the use of the pun on niima by Vasubandhu,
Saghabhadra and Asaliga. Namana literally means 'bending', and the point is that the
four ariipakkhandhas (collectively taken to mean niima, though this assumption is discussed in
chapter vr) "go towards objects (artha) as though naming them, thus 'bending' toward them
. . . [and] because when the body disintegrates, these aggregates, so to say, bend toward
another existence".
For example, MA.1.221; Vism p.528.
KS.III.73, n.1.
cf Monier Williams' Sanskrit Englkh Dictiona~, p.884 and p.904.
KS.III.73, n.1. Karunadasa (1967, p.gf) discusses the use ofruppati.
For example, SN.III.59: Katamafica bhikkhave rCpar.n? Cattiiro ca mahiibhitii catunnam ca
mahiibhltiinam upidiija nipam idam vuccati bhikkhave nipam.
For example, MN.I.423, 111.241. In the Abhidhamma, CrkiisadhZtu is considered to be part of
the category ofupiidi ('secondary ' or 'derived') nipa (for example, Dhs 638). As we shall see,
upiidii nips is systematised and classified in the Abhid/zamma in a way which is completely
absent fi-om the fbur main flikiijas of'the Sutta Pitaka.
MN.I.185ff, 42rff, III.2qoff: Pa{havidIzZtu [ipo-, tejo-, vlT;yu-] s+ii ajhattikii s+ii biihirii. I
mentioned in the Introduction the convention where ajhattam and bahiddhii are used to
make a distinction between oneself' and others. Here, this convention is not being used
(save in the sense that what is external to oneself' includes other people). In the
Patisambhidiimagga of' the Khuddaka Nikqa, there is a classification of what is 'internal'
(ajhatta) and 'external' (bahiddhi). Among other characteristics, they are defined as being
'produced by craving' (taghZsambhiita), suggesting they are upiidii (see the discussion below).
The senses and sense objects are the factors classified, but they are not specifically stated to
he nipa (Patis 1.76-78).
cf. Harvey, 1991, p.3.
Udiina VII1.i: Atthi bhikWlaue tad ciyatanam, yattha n'eva pafivi na iipo na tejo nu viiyo . . . . Pande
(1983, p. 711) discusses the lateness of the prose sections of' the Udiina as, in effect,
commenting on the earlier verses it contains. Our quotation is part of a prose section,
maybe indicating that the question of the conditioned nature of'the cattiro rnahiibhritii needed
to be clarified. The passage need not (and, in my opinion, should not) be interpreted
ontologically: the fbur elements are a feature ofsapsiitic perception, not of 'seeing things as
they really are' (Nirvana). Nor does the term qatuna, often translated as 'sphere', necessarily
have spacial implications: we shall see in the next section ofthis chapter that when used in
connection with the senses it has no spacial meaning: In the context quoted here, 'condition'
is meant in the sense of 'state', with no causative connotations.