Identity and Experience_Hamilton_1996

The San"n"ikhandha 55
discriminatory: vin"n"ina is said to discriminate (veinitz) pleasure, pain and
the absence of pleasure or pain and the standard list of colours is again the
example given for what san"n"i discriminates. The discrimination between
feelings according to pleasure, pain and their absence is also mentioned in
the Satipafihina Suttas,ll but there it is mentioned as part of the process of
attaining insight rather than as a brief definition of the function of uin"n"i?:
the cognitive verb used is pajlniti rather than @iniiti. The Mahivedallasutta,
which is discussed in chapter v, gives a comprehensive description of the
cognitive process. As we shall see, the function of vin"n"ina is to provide
'consciousness of' all cognition rather than to discriminate. But the brief
definitions given in this Sutta for these two terms do little to clarify their
roles. What we seem to have here is another example of the author of the
passage having difficulty in defining the terms he is using: he is able to
describe the cognitive process using the relevant terminology, but when it
comes to defining the Wlandhas involved in the cognitive process he resorts
to standard formulas in place of adequate definitions. Alternatively, both of
these passages may reflect the practical difficulties associated with an oral
tradition: the ease with which teachings that are standardised for mnemonic
purposes can end up in contexts that are not quite suitable.
Centuries later, Buddhaghosa gives more comprehensive definitions of
both san"n"6 and vin"ii@a as cognitive faculties (jlZnanabhiva)(along with pan"ii9,
and he uses colours as examples for both of them, thus making a proper
comparison possible. The difference between san"n"i and vin"n"Zna, he explains
in his Visuddhimagga, is that the former identifies an object as blue or yellow
but cannot bring about the penetration of its characteristics as impermanent,
unsatisfactory and impersonal.12 The latter identifies an object as blue
or yellow, penetrates its characteristics, but cannot bring about, even
through endeavour, the manifestation of the supramundane path.13 It is
pan"n"i that does all these things.14 Thus Buddhaghosa understands all three
as discriminatory faculties. He goes on to give the analogy of the
understanding of a child, an adult and an expert respectively. While there
may be the germ of such a threefold division of cognitive functions in the
Sutta Pitaka, it is far from being as tidy and consistent as Buddhaghosa
presents it. And we shall see in chapter v that though it is integral to the
cognitive process, vin"n"ina is not specifically discriminative.
If we return to the passage in the Sutta Piiaka describing the arising of
feeling, we have a context which gives us a much clearer description of
saEEi as a faculty which discriminates or identifies. It is significant that
vin"n"ipz in this context has no discriminatory function, but is stated to arise
when eye (for example) and visible object are mutually present.'= Here
uin"n"ipz has the meaning of the 'awareness' which underlies or 'attends' all
human (i.e. conscious) experience.16 We then saw that the feeling
subsequently gives rise to sarln"i.17 The Pali continues: yam sa@initi tam
vitaliketi, yam uitakketi tampapaEceti. To make sense of this, it is relevant that in