Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

in force until February 2008, when sea-launched missiles, pursuant to the order of the U.S. command,hit a U.S. reconnaissance satellite that had outlived its usefulness.From the military and technological point of view, there was practically nothing new in such ademonstration of anti-satellite weapons. That U.S. satellite was hit, first of all, to demonstrate U.S.capabilities in that area and to vindicate the U.S. intention to preserve a free hand in outer spacein the context of use of force and development of weapons, including anti-satellite weapons.U.S. policy concerning activities in outer space in the 21st century, which began to shape in 2001–2002, looks similarly unambiguous. On the one hand, it proclaims the special importance of allspace systems for fulfillment of civil and military tasks, and emphasizes their large vulnerability toopposing anti-satellite activities (the policy directly mentions the China’s increasing anti-satellitecapabilities). On the other hand, it contains distinct allusions that the U.S. itself will be developingsuch means of destruction, and will provide for the military protection of its own space vehicles.As a comment on the last thesis, it is more difficult to develop an efficient means of proactivedefense of space vehicles than it is to develop any limited anti-missile defense system. Thus, wecan assume that U.S. policy and military strategy may refer to other means and methods that donot rule out the possibility of preemptive strikes on any other countries’ forces and military assetsthat may be deemed threatening to U.S. activities in outer space (with due regard for the principleof taking preemptive military action against any threat to the U.S. national security, which wasdefined in the U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy).According to international media reports, more than a year before the U.S. hit its satellite witha sea-launched missile, on 11 January 2007 the China conducted a single anti-satellite missiletest, showing the United States that, as an English proverb says, “people who live in glass housesshould not throw stones.” The test, conducted by China using a German interceptor missile, was afirst-of-its-kind test of anti-satellite technologies in the past 20 years. 26A wide variety of potential anti-satellite technologies have been available for several decades.Indeed, technologies for their development have existed since the end of the 1950s (some evenbefore then). Anti-satellite systems can be ground-based, sea-based, air-based and space-based.They may use kinetic-energy means of destruction and directed-energy weapons such as lasersand particle accelerators. They may use various electronic warfare tactics; in order to cause satellitesto malfunction, there is no need to destroy them physically; it is sufficient just to blind themand to break their connection with ground control using various weapons of electronic warfare,such as electronic jamming systems. In the early 1980s, the USSR and the United States conductedvery advanced R&D programs with the goal of establishing such systems. They used heavyfighters—the Soviet MiG-31 interceptor and the U.S. F-15 multi-purpose aircraft, respectively,that were armed with two-stage satellite-killer missiles designed to be launched from aircraft inthe upper atmosphere in order to hit low-orbit satellites. Anti-satellite weapons also includedvarious types of “space mines” that could be deployed in advance in relevant orbits.Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 19