Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

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combat readiness of all three components of its strategic nuclear forces, and to provide for theirmodernization, which could not but tell on the actual balance of forces in its dyad structure. 96 Inaddition, the United States has expended considerable effort on enhance the counterforce potentialof the its SNF—i.e., its ability to deliver a preemptive, disarming strike on the SNF of anyother country. As mentioned above, this may be deemed as one of the means of securing escalatorydomination in the event of a grave international crisis.After George W. Bush came to power, deviations from the principles of strategic stability beganto become obvious. This was also demonstrated by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty(SORT) of 24 May 2002; 97 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was one of the most illustrative examples.There was a strong political and ideological motive behind that, as well as an intention bythe Bush administration to gain a footing as the world’s only superpower, and to deprive Russia ofthis status, even in the nuclear sphere.50Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions
Chapter 12: The Role of Other Nuclear Powers, Which Are Also Members ofthe UN Security Council, in Defining the Formula for Strategic StabilityThe Soviet Union had recurrently brought up the issue of engagement of other nuclear powers inthe process of limitation and reduction of offensive weapons. In these latter days Russia has beenreasonably emphasizing the need to encourage other countries to join the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces Treaty (INF).It should be noted that such countries as China, France, Great Britain and India actively continueto modernize their nuclear forces and assets enhancing their warheads and their delivery vehicles.The estimated number of China’s silo-based ICBMs (DongFeng 5A missiles, deployed since 1981)is 20 single-warhead missiles with 4–5 megaton warheads as of 2008. 98 It is assumed that theseICBMs may be reequipped with lighter 3 warheads with false targets for breaking through theother side’s missile defense system. The estimated number of deployed land-based mobile missilesystems DongFeng 31 and DongFeng 31A (intercontinental range) is 12 pieces.China for quite a while had faced serious problems with development of the naval component ofits strategic nuclear forces—submarines with long-range ballistic missiles. According to expertestimates, China is 18–20 years behind the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France in thatkind of technologies. It is assumed that China has only one submarine of that kind and two moreare under construction. China’s MRBMs may be considered as means of deterrence of the UnitedStates and their allies in the Asia-Pacific region and measures to countervail the nuclear arsenal ofIndia and certain part of the nuclear arsenal of Russia. 99China’s nuclear arsenal has not considerably changed in size for many years. In February 2006the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reiterated the estimate made by various U.S.government agencies since the middle of the 1990s: Beijing had more than 100 active nuclearwarheads deployed on ballistic missiles. Additional munitions constitute the reserve 100 . Accordingto the estimates of a number of non-governmental analysts, China’s combat-ready arsenal doesnot exceed 80 warheads. 101China was the first country to declare the principle of non-use of nuclear weapons and had remainedthe only state that followed that principle until the Soviet Union joined it. Today Chinaagain is the only state, which adheres to this principle in absolute terms. Along with its obligationnot to use nuclear weapons, China undertook (without any preconditions) not to use or threatento use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.In conformity with the 2004 National Defense White Paper, China “rests on the principles of selfdefensivecounterstrike and limited development of nuclear forces and strives to build streamlinedand efficient nuclear forces” with an obligation not to engage in a nuclear arms race with anyother country. 102 The white paper also emphasizes that China “always pursues a policy of no firstuse of nuclear weapons in all circumstances and at any time.” 103China is gradually moving to the position of the world’s second superpower. Relatively soonChina’s leaders will have to take very serious decisions concerning its strategic nuclear forces. TheBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 51
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Ensuring StrategicStability in the
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