Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

Chapter 10: Challenges of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, DeliveryVehicles and Fissile MaterialsIn the modern context, the problem of achieving non-proliferation objectives with respect tonuclear weapons, to their delivery vehicles, 83 and to the fissile materials that are produced in largequantities, has moved to the forefront of global politics as they pertain to strategic stability.There is a real threat that nuclear weapons and fissile materials may fall into the hands of extremists.And here, the situation in Pakistan (which, according to a number of authoritative estimates,has drastically increased its nuclear potential) is a matter of special concern to the internationalcommunity. The consequences of a terrorist group using just one nuclear warhead are equitablydeemed as catastrophic, both for the victims of such mega-terror and for the entire global politicalsystem as a whole. This threat is still underestimated by a considerable part of the politicalelites in many countries. At a time when civilian use of nuclear power is on the rise in many partsof the world, the international community is nevertheless failing to harden its nuclear-securitymeasures, which is making it all the easier for a terrorist group to illicitly acquire fissile materialsthat could be used in the production of a nuclear bombs. 84The importance of this problem is reflected in the 2005 International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This is the first anti-terrorist convention developed by theinternational community to prevent terrorist use of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.The Convention first of all defines radioactive and nuclear activities (pp. 1–2 of Article1). It specifies nuclear objects in detail. And these are not just the nuclear reactors used at nuclearpower stations, but also the nuclear reactors deployed in various transport modalities, includingsea vessels, aircraft and space-based systems) as a source of energy (pp. 3a of Article 1). Thus, thelist of nuclear objects subject to protection has been considerably expanded.In conformity with this document, the signatories agree that any unlawful or intentional possessionand use of a radioactive material or a device containing radioactive substances with intent tocause death or serious bodily injury, substantial damage to property or to the environment shallbe deemed a criminal offense on the part of any natural or legal person, international organization,or state (pp. 1a, b of Article 2).Acquisition of nuclear-power status by new states may drastically complicate and perplex theentire system that currently provides for the securing of regional and global strategic stability.This perspective is absolutely realistic these days, notwithstanding the efforts of the internationalcommunity. For example, acquisition of nuclear-missile weapons by Iran 85 would create a verycomplex inter-regional, sub-global nuclear configuration—a sort of a hexagon formed by the nationsof China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Israel; 86 in this context, the interactions amongthe elements of the hexagon will definitely be influenced by the central nuclear balance betweenRussia and the United States that is the successor to the USSR-U.S. balance. (In this respect,there is a high probability that Iran will be quickly followed by Saudi Arabia, which will becomea nuclear power by virtue of its long-term deep relations with Pakistan. 87 Thus, the hexagon mayturn into a heptagon in the near future). In view of the development of nuclear-missile weaponsby North Korea and the nuclear status of China, a complex polygonal nuclear configuration may44Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions