Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

82. In this area, like in many other areas, as a result of assignment of unrealistic, overstated tasks, operational and combat training for the commandstaff becomes “decorative.”83. The problem of non-proliferation of biological and bacteriological weapons is equally (or even more) important from the point of view of actuallysecuring strategic stability, especially in the context of the latest achievements in gene engineering and the extensive work that is carried out inthat field by state, academic, and corporate research and development centers. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Productionand Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction as of 1972 definitely needs amendment and elaboration.However, from what I can see, this issue is beyond the scope of strategic stability in its current understanding.84. In the beginning of the 1990s, Trutnev wrote that the attained level of development of nuclear-power engineering in the Third World countries(the total volume amounted to 50 percent of the volume of nuclear-power engineering in the USSR) stipulated the annual use of a substantialamount of uranium fuel that amounted to 400 to 500 tons of uranium dioxide (where the uranium-235 enrichment level was 3 percent). Accordingto Trutnev’s estimate, “this amount is sufficient (if the relevant decision is made) for making 15 tons of weapon-grade uranium highly enrichedwith isotope U235 and production of several hundreds of warheads with relatively high parameters.” Another opportunity to use nuclear-powerengineering for establishing nuclear arsenals in the Third World countries is the use of transuranium elements contained in the spent fuel. Accordingto Trutnev’s estimates, the annual amount of plutonium isotopes at the aforementioned reactors at that time amounted to between 3 and 4 tons,which was also sufficient for making many hundreds of nuclear warheads. See Trutnev, p. 337.85. Several estimates show that by the first quarter of 2009, Iran enough low-enriched uranium to manufacture at least one nuclear warhead if theuranium were reprocessed into highly-enriched uranium.86. It is believed that Israel’s nuclear-warhead delivery vehicles may include fighter-bomber aircraft with a combat radius of 1,600 km, groundlaunchedJericho ballistic missiles with a range of 1,500 to 1,800 km, and sea-based cruise missiles launched from non-nuclear vessels like the German-madeDolphin submarines that Israel buys abroad. There is speculation that Israel has produced such nuclear munitions as artillery shells andmines. See “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” SIPRI Yearbook 2007, pp. 590–591. The estimated number of Israel’s nuclearmunitions is 100 to 200 plutonium warheads. Israel predominantly adheres to the policy of “nuclear uncertainty,” officially neither confirming norrefuting the fact that it has nuclear weapons.87. See Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe,” New York: Owl Books / Henry Holt, 2005, pp. 76–77.88. The continuing erosion of the situation in Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan to the advantage of Islamic terrorists constitutes a threat that ata certain moment, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may to one extent or another (directly or indirectly) end up in the hands of Islamic extremists, withall the ensuing consequences. Unchecked further development of the situation in the aforementioned zone will force Russia and its allies, underthe Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to make certain new decisions. In this respect, a specialrole should be played by Russia’s agreements with China, India and Iran, which should constitute the basis of Russia’s policy toward Afghanistan,Pakistan and the activities of the United States and its NATO allies in this region.89. S. A. Oborotov, “Yaderny factor v amerikano-indiyskikh otnosheniyakh” (“The Nuclear Factor in U.S.-India Relations”), 1991–2008. MoscowLibrocom/URSS, 2009, p. 104.90. Oborotov notes that tactical and technical characteristics of the Ghauri were superior to those of India’s short-range Prithvi missile, which wasready for deployment, while the medium-range Agni missile was still under development and needed to be tested. See S. A. Oborotov, op. cit., pp.102–103.91. Oborotov, op. cit., p. 103.92. Ibid., pp. 104–110.93. Ibid., pp. 112–113.94. V. I. Sotnikov, “Yadernaya problema v indo-pakistanskikh otnosheniyakh (vtoraya polovina XX – nachalo XXI v.)” (“The Nuclear Problem inIndia-Pakistan Relations [Second Half of the 20th Century—Beginning of the 21st Century]”), Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2003, pp. 160–161.95. “We have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit United States’ orNATO’s missile defense capabilities,” Letter from U.S. President Barack Obama to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid, 19 December 2010.Available at:http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/December/20101220112111su0.6327565.html#ixzz1HjNgkHn696. A number of U.S. experts and representatives of the military department express grave dissatisfaction and serious concerns about the problemsof modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and its ability to provide for modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal.97. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the United States and the Russian Federation as of 24 May 2002 mentions thenecessity of building of “a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,” and the desire “to establish a genuine partnershipbased on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability.” We all know very well how Washington de-factoimplemented these principles.Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 67