Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

Chapter 15: On the System of “Pre-Nuclear” Deterrence for RussiaMany experts and politicians have long doubted the value of nuclear threshold reduction, rightlybelieving that alongside reduction of the threshold, any threat to use nuclear weapons becomesless ponderable, even if we talk about random use not against actual targets, but somewhere in thedesert, just to demonstrate determination.Reduction of the nuclear threshold for the Russian armed forces has been to a large extent conditionedby the weakness of Russia’s general-purpose forces in the context of the accretion of military-politicaluncertainty in the world, and of the clearly growing role of the military componentof national security.The problem of cogency of deterrence in the event of reduction of the nuclear threshold in thecontext of relations with nuclear powers and non-nuclear states requires consideration of otheradditional measures aimed at enhancing the cogency of deterrence and, consequently, its effectiveness.There are such opportunities, for example, in the area of use of long-range high-precision weaponsof various types and weapons with conventional warheads, including high-precision warheads,using such platforms as, first of all, subsurface and surface combat ships and long-rangebombers.In the beginning of the 1980s, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov and a number of other experts, includingArmy Gen. Vitaly Shabanov and members of his team, noted that the yield of conventionalmunitions was getting close to the yield of low-yield nuclear weapons. Enhancement of guidanceaccuracy, which has been constantly increasing over the past 15 to 20 years, leads to improvementof conventional warheads’ ability to hit a wide variety of military and economic targets. Also,the use of conventional warheads, even high-yield warheads, does not entail the effects that areinevitably associated with the use of any type of nuclear warheads, even mini-nukes that deliverpenetrating radiation, causing radioactive contamination of the soil and water.Any forceful threat to use a high-precision long-range delivery vehicle with a conventional warheadcould become the basis of the pre-nuclear deterrence system that amplifies the nucleardeterrence system. In this regard, a potential aggressor must bear in mind that it may expect notjust a strike on its military assets and forces, which are deployed and directly targeted at Russia,but on a number of other assets.The use of such weapons must be politically represented as an act of last warning preceding theselective use of relatively low-yield nuclear munitions.Such weapons should be primarily used for hitting high-cost assets and complex national securitysystems that are located relatively far away from densely populated areas. In particular, suchobjects would include ground-based electronic intelligence centers, large ships of similar designation,communications centers, and command and control centers. As a rule, such assets areBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 57