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Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

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Chapter 2: On <strong>the</strong> Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong> Parameters of <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong>The core of <strong>the</strong> modern military <strong>and</strong> strategic balance is its most dangerous <strong>and</strong> destructivecomponent: nuclear forces <strong>and</strong> means, start<strong>in</strong>g with strategic assets. In this context, <strong>the</strong>re are veryclose connections among <strong>the</strong> two sides’ separate offensive <strong>and</strong> defensive forces <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> each of<strong>the</strong>ir military forces. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> stability of <strong>the</strong> balance, especially <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> event of nuclearstalemate, is essentially <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>the</strong>ir general-purpose forces <strong>and</strong> conventional arms.The concept of stability is implied to estimate how easy it is to startle <strong>and</strong> destabilize a system—<strong>in</strong>this <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> super-system of strategic nuclear <strong>in</strong>teraction—out of its current state. 27 Thisconcept logically implies an estimate of <strong>the</strong> risk of an outbreak of nuclear war, <strong>in</strong> view of <strong>the</strong>given correlation <strong>and</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> parties’ military forces <strong>and</strong>, first <strong>and</strong> foremost, <strong>the</strong> strategicpotential of those forces. The ma<strong>in</strong> aspect of stability is <strong>the</strong> existence of a certa<strong>in</strong> potential barrierthat, if cleared as a result of some external disturbance, would cause <strong>the</strong> transition of <strong>the</strong> strategicmilitary super-system <strong>in</strong>to a qualitatively new state—from <strong>the</strong> typical <strong>in</strong>teractions of peacetime to<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>teractions that are characteristic of <strong>the</strong> fundamentally different logic of military conflict, alogic that leads to a nuclear, strategic war.This potential barrier is formed by a group of political <strong>and</strong> military factors, where <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipalfactor is a correlation between <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g elements:• The political <strong>and</strong> military goals of nuclear war of various scales <strong>and</strong> types;• The capabilities of each side to use force <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> resolution of crisis situations, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> currentlyavailable material <strong>and</strong> technical resources available for <strong>the</strong> prosecution of such a war; <strong>and</strong>• The relevant consequences of us<strong>in</strong>g such force.The stability of <strong>the</strong> balance is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> parameters, which are decisive factors <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>evaluation of how easily one of <strong>the</strong> sides would disrupt <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g balance <strong>and</strong> atta<strong>in</strong> superiority,<strong>and</strong> how difficult it would be for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side to take countermeasures to restore <strong>the</strong> balance byneutraliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se steps.The concepts of balance or equilibrium, <strong>and</strong> stability formerly reflected one <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same conditionof strategic balance for each sides’ forces. In <strong>the</strong> first half of <strong>the</strong> 1970s, <strong>the</strong>se concepts began todiffer <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>the</strong> Soviet Union was several years beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> U.S. <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of masstransition from s<strong>in</strong>gle-warhead missiles to MIRVs). 28 The term “equilibrium” more likely reflectsquantitative parameters of <strong>the</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g nuclear super-system, while <strong>the</strong> concept of stability characterizesits quality. (Therefore, equilibrium, or balance, may be stable or unstable). The emergentdifference does not resolve itself <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> semantic nonidentity of <strong>the</strong> two concepts; ra<strong>the</strong>r, it isdeeply practical, s<strong>in</strong>ce it provides for <strong>the</strong> identification of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> problems that determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>crease or reduction of risk of nuclear conflicts, 29 <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> risk of an outbreak of nuclearwar.Ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of military <strong>and</strong> strategic equilibrium with due regard for exist<strong>in</strong>g nuclear-missile armamentsdoes not stipulate ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of <strong>the</strong> exact symmetric equality of <strong>the</strong> two sides’ forces.To a certa<strong>in</strong> extent, <strong>the</strong> enormous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons equalizes <strong>the</strong>20<strong>Ensur<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Stability</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Past</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Present</strong>: Theoretical <strong>and</strong> Applied Questions

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