Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

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located far away from densely populated areas, and their destruction would not entail numerouscasualties—be it direct casualties or collateral damage.At higher stages of escalation, still at the pre-nuclear stage, we could be talking about the destructionof similar civilian targets—such as infrastructural assets located relatively far away from largeurban areas—with the aim of minimizing civilian casualties while bringing measurable economicdamage to the aggressor. (Nuclear power stations would be exempt from targeting at this phase,given that a strike on such a target may be deemed as a military action involving the use of nuclearmunitions.)Russia’s level of scientific and technological development allows us to have such means of prenucleardeterrence (sea-based, ground-based and air-based) and to develop them in due course.Meanwhile, it should be borne in mind that the pre-nuclear deterrence system, even more that thenuclear deterrence system, depends on the development of the relevant information infrastructure,including reconnaissance, target assignment, and navigation, among other things.This is the only way to ensure the selective destruction of the relevant targets. And the adversaryshould realize that pre-nuclear deterrence is not a bluff, but a real political-military tool in thehands of Russia’s leadership that is secured by all the necessary components.Nuclear deterrence, though important, is not a panacea guaranteeing Russia’s national security.It is impossible, even dangerous, to use it to parry or neutralize the entire spectrum of militarypoliticalthreats to Russia’s security. Excessive confidence in nuclear deterrence in national securitypolicy is detrimental and even dangerous for Russia. Nuclear power may only partially compensatefor Russia’s inferiority in economic and political assets, and in general-purpose militaryforces. Thus, in addition to other measures, nuclear deterrence must be underpinned by efficientpre-nuclear deterrence. As Russian historian and ideologist of development of the Russian NavyPyotr Belavenets wrote at the beginning of the 20th century, permanent “readiness to attack theadversary’s territory would deter it from attacking our lands.” This unjustifiably forgotten authorrightly emphasized that this verity always was and always will be true.58Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 59
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Ensuring StrategicStability in the
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This paper was commissioned by the
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Chapter 13:Challenges of Limiting A
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Kokoshin, who has spent decades hel
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Ensuring that there is no such gap
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