Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:

End Notes1. Critics claim that the principle of strategic stability, which is based on mutual nuclear deterrence, epitomizes a confrontational approach andthat it supposedly hinders the development of political relations with the United States. I can counter such criticism by noting that Russia’s nationalsecurity interests cannot be sacrificed even for the sake of very good political relations with the United States. Critics also note that the traditionalformula of strategic stability is based on the “dyad” relationship; therefore, it is practically impossible to involve a third nuclear power in the processof limiting and reducing nuclear weapons.2. Y. A. Trutnev, “Na blago Rossii: K 75-letiu akademiki RAN Yu. A. Trutneva” (“For the Benefit of Russia: Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary ofAcademician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Y. A. Trutnev”), Sarov, Saransk: Krasnyi Oktyabr, 2002, p. 334.3. See Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe,” New York: Owl Books / Henry Holt, 2005; A. A. Kokoshin,“Zametki o probleme yadernogo terrorizma v sovremennoi mirovoi politike” (“Notes on the Problem of Nuclear Terrorism in ContemporaryInternational Politics”), Moscow: Lenand / URSS, 2006.4. “Brown pushes for world reduction of nuclear weapons as he makes Iran offer,” Guardian, 17 March 2009.5. The October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis—called “the Caribbean Crisis” in Russian—is an event of utmost significance in world history. Itdemands the thoroughgoing examination of scientists and specialists, and, at a minimum, a general examination by state leaders, politicians ofvarious ranks and the supreme military command. I would note the following works on this subject: A. F. Dobrynin, “Sugubo doveritelno: Posolpri sheti prezidentakh SShA: 1962–1968” (“Strictly Confidential: Ambassador to Six U.S. Presidents: 1962–1968”), Moscow, 1997; Graham Allisonand Philipp Zelikow, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,” New York: Pearson Longman, 1999; A. Fursenko and T. Naftali,“Adskaya igra: Sekretnaya istoriya karibskogo krizisa 1958–1964” (“Hellish Game: A Secret History of the Caribbean Crisis: 1958–1964”), Moscow:Geya iterum, 1999; and S. A. Mikoyan, “Anatomiya karibskogo krizisa” (“Anatomy of the Caribbean Crisis”), Moscow: Academia, 2006.6. Allison and Zelikow, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 2nd ed., New York: Pearson Longman, 1999.7. George Shultz served as U.S. secretary of state for seven years in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. He saw action with the U.S.Marines in World War II.8. William Perry headed the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1990s during the presidency of Bill Clinton. In the 1970s he served as undersecretaryof defense for research and engineering during the Jimmy Carter administration. He is considered to be the “godfather” of an entire series ofhigh-precision long-range conventional weapons. Perry is a professor at Stanford University. He has served on the board of directors of a numberof large science-intensive American corporations.9. Henry A. Kissinger served as national security advisor to the president of the United States for a long period of time. He is one of the mostprominent political scientists and historians specializing in diplomacy and international politics. He became a public servant after working atHarvard University where, among other things, he wrote “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy” (1957), which became one of the classical worksin this field. He fought in World War II. Kissinger is an author of a number of fundamental works on diplomacy, political science and internationalrelations, which were published after he had finished his political and diplomatic career. His works include “Diplomacy,” a Russian translation ofwhich was published in Russia in 1994.10. Sam Nunn chaired the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services for a number of years. In the 1980s, he played an important rolein preserving the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, publicly opposing then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and otherproponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative.11. See, for instance: G. D. Kulichkov, VNIIEF, “Istoricheskii ocherk: 1946–1992,” Sarov: RFYaTs-VNIIEF, 1998, p. 92.12. The Interceptor Missile V-1000 had a maximum velocity of 1,000 meters per second. It could intercept a target at an altitude of 25 km. See I. D.Yevtiev, “Iz istorii sozdania zenitnoraketnogo shchita Rossii – o sozdanii zenitnykh upravlyayemykh raket i zenitno-raketnykh kompleksov v Rossiii stranakh NATO” (“From the History of the Development of the Missile Defense Shield of Moscow: On the Development of Guided Missilesfor Air Defense Systems in Russia and NATO countries”), Moscow: Vyzovksaya kniga, 2000, p. 75.13. The decision of the country’s leadership on national missile defense is documented in the joint statement of the Central Committee of theCPSU and the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers, released on 4 May 1963 and titled “On the development of the missile defense of the national territory.”See M. Pervov, “Sistemy raketno-kosmicheskoi oboroni sozdavalis tak” (“This is How the Space and Missile Defense Systems of the Country wereCreated”), 2nd ed., AVIARIUS-XXI, 2004, p. 153.14. Pervov, p. 152.15. Yevtiev, pp. 123–126.16. Ibid., p. 172.17. Pervov, p. 172.62Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions