tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

their behaviour. Disciplinary power is thereby legitimized. Privatization can thus enablea process of classification, observation, and individualization of entrepreneurs; itguides their behaviour so that the process meant to symbolize the emancipation ofthe private sphere is transformed into a vigorously led planning, a freedom kept undersurveillance, and a continuous monitoring. Privatisation should be analyzed less in termsof the modernization of the productive apparatus and entrepreneurial governance (asis believed by the technical programs set up by donors, beginning with the EuropeanUnion) than in terms of modes of government, control, and surveillance.I.2.G European policies in TunisiaThese last examples bring out the full ambiguity of European cooperation policies, in Tunisia as inall Mediterranean third countries. The purpose of this report is not to make an assessment of theEuro-Mediterranean policy, since this has often been done already. 84 Instead, if we are to betterunderstand the challenges posed by the period after 14 January to European cooperation, itwill be useful to summarize its main features.First, it is indisputable that partnership and the Neighbourhood Policy reflect a very liberal ideology:this is evidenced by the centrality, in the institutional set-up, of the free trade zones betweeneach partner in the South and the European Union, the adoption of structural adjustmentprograms and more generally the support for the processes of economic liberalization, theprimacy of economic and commercial logics over social logics and development logics. This isclear from the distribution of European funds that primarily go into these economic programs:industrial upgrading and more generally support for development and competitiveness,improving the employability of workers, and economic reforms aimed towards harmonizationwith European standards. That said, regulatory and interventionist activism also characterizesthe Euro-Mediterranean policy, with an authoritarian approach and security of borders(closure or system of quotas, visas), the bureaucratic management of funds that are by natureinterventionist, and a constant effort to spread European norms and standards.Secondly, there is a conviction (at least in northern partners) that economic liberalization leadsto political liberalization. But the signing of association agreements has not only resulted in asignificant increase in investment, renewed growth and therefore development; despite decentgrowth rates (and for Tunisia in particular, a respect for really balanced budgets), the region isexperiencing genuine economic and social difficulties, which the services of the EuropeanCommission also recognized before the ‘Arab spring’, and which the events of recent monthshave served to highlight. And, as is masterfully illustrated by the case of Tunisia, presented byEurope until early January 2011 as the model student of the Partnership, the economic reformshave not resulted in the implementation of political reforms or of democratization: far from it.4884 For an overview in terms of political economy, see the special number ‘Les faces cachées dupartenariat euro-méditerranéen’, Critique internationale, 18, April 2003.