tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

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diminishing trickle. At the national level, social negotiations now take place only onceevery three years, on government initiative, and they focus almost exclusively on wages.Outside these meetings, there is no institution for negotiation. Furthermore, we know theambiguous role played by the UGTT. At the business level, dialogue has been greatlyimpoverished. The Business Committee, which enjoyed financial and technical autonomyfrom the employer, the Health and Safety Committee and the Joint Commission (inelections to which the union took an active role) were abolished and replaced by asingle substantially weakened organisation (the Joint Business Committee). 151 It has noautonomy from the entrepreneur and the union is not involved or even consulted inhis election. In terms of work organization, recruitment, compression, and closure, it isthe bosses’ unilateral power to decide which prevails. In free zones, finally, where labourrelations are based solely on fixed-term contracts, structures of dialogue are difficult tocreate. So if we are move from a situation of inertia in which decisions are imposed fromabove to a real dialogue, we must simultaneously rethink the role and functioning of theadministration and the place of unions in the economic, political, and social landscapeof Tunisia. For now, the UTICA, which had been fully aligned with the party and had swornallegiance, through its chair, to Ben Ali, is in total disarray and indeed non-existent. TheUGTT, for its part, is torn between a base and some of its structures that are urging socialprotest, a de-legitimized management, the culture of compromise of the bureaucracy,and government pressure. The temptation to get involved in politics (an ephemeralpresence in government and in the higher courts) is counterbalanced by the fear ofbeing trapped by politics. The essential thing, however, is being ignored: internal powerrelations, the potential and scope of social mobilization (the element that is driven bytrade unionists, and the ‘wild’ element), the capacity of the UTICA to exert pressure whenit is itself in crisis, and that, of course, of the government. Reorganization will take placerapidly, and obviously, no one knows the outcome. But the existence of a genuine socialdialogue requires above all that power relations, modes of negotiation, the passing onof demands, their means of transmission and the operation of intermediary bodies beredrawn.II.2.B.e. For an analysis of the political economyFinally, it seems to us crucial to reflect on one thing if there is to be any real considerationof economic and social rights, and more broadly of the requirements of democratisation:we need, that is, to reflect on the political economy itself, in other words on the impossibilityof separating out distinct spheres, those of the economic and the political spheres.82What is striking, after all, in the analysis of the ‘miracle’ and in the interventions of donors,is the generalising of dualistic analyses that deal separately with politics and economics.At European level, this position is farcically exaggerated, in spite of the assertion (uniquein international forums) of the indivisibility of rights. On the one hand, political questionsare asked, in this case with a strong commitment to supporting the democratic process,human rights, civil liberties... and, on the other hand, economic and social affairs151 This transformation and the creation of the Joint Business Committee were brought about by theamendment of the 1994 Labour Code: law 94-29 of 21 February 1994.
T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C Yare handled by technicians in an apolitical vision of development expertise whichconsiders the economy as an object to be manipulated and directed. This position isnot new; it goes hand-in-hand with European interventions (and more generally with theinterventions of donors). Previously, we had on the one side a more or less complacent andchaotic political dialogue (with the signing of conventions, agreements on association,‘dialogue’ within sub-committees and other bodies) and on the other the resolute andconstructive pursuit of economic cooperation. In the current context of the redefinitionof European politics, this dualism is perpetuated and the European authorities continueto treat these two ‘sides’ in a differentiated way. This results in communiqués promisingchange that seem at odds with the cumbersome technocratic machinery. The formulaof Mrs Ashton that redefines the European policy vis-à-vis Tunisia by the ‘3 Ms’ (Money,Market, Mobility) 152 is, to be sure, primarily a slogan for the media and the expression of anattempt to distinguish itself from its bureaucratic competitors. It clearly reveals, however,this inability to think through the political sphere in Europe and especially to consider thelinkages between politics and economics. Similarly, reflections heard in the operationalservices on the previous period confirm this dualistic inertia that still persists: ‘either we gofor “human rights”, or we go for cooperation’, we ‘could not do otherwise, the Europeaninstruments are instruments of dialogue and cooperation’ so that it would have been‘inappropriate’ to use these instruments of economic cooperation to put pressure on thepolitical. 153On the one side, then, there is support for the political transition, which results in expertise andelectoral observation, through support to identified actors in civil society, the media, etc.And on the other, an attempt is made to boost economic cooperation, but according toprevious patterns in that these economic programs are assessed only in economic termsand are modified only marginally at best. Indeed, there is no fundamental questioning ofeconomic cooperation programs. European technicians believe that ‘fine work has beendone in the economic sphere’ but that ‘freezes were mainly in governance, human rightsand justice.’ The business climate, improving conditions of employability, improving theregulatory framework, and deepening liberalization are still in the news, as is emphasizedby in the European experts directly involved in the conceptualization of cooperation,‘the major structural reforms that enable the framework for development to be built arestill the same’. 154 The philosophy of partnership between Europe and its south has notaltered in the least, with the emphasis always on free trade, the benefits of the marketand the harmonization of standards (with those of Europe, of course) without taking intoaccount the political dimension of these economic developments. Bilateral economicprograms seek to carefully consider the consequences of their actions on gender orthe environment, but these impact studies are superficial and mechanistic and analysethese effects only a posteriori, in a vision totally dissociated from economic instrumentsand social consequences; moreover, they do not fundamentally reflect, in the very83152 Press communiqué of the European Union, 11 March 2011 (A 102/11). Remarks by EU High RepresentativeCatherine Ashton on arrival at the Extraordinary European Council. See also ‘Ashton’s fluctuation scalefor EU aid with the Arab World, www.newsportal.european-left.org, 15 March 2001.153 Extracts from interviews, Brussels, 29 March – 1 April 2011.154 Extracts from interviews, Brussels, 29 March – 1 April 2011The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy
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TUNISIA AFTER 14 JANUARY AND ITSSOC
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This document has been produced wit
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T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U
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E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r yMADE
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An alarming socio-economic situatio
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In public debate, the analysis of c
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half between conceptualization and
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I N T R O D U C T I o nMADE by Euro
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More specifically the report is an
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I. The rhetoric of ‘stability’
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I . 1 . T h e m o d e s o f c o n s
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modernisation and is now the engine
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I.1.E.The concealment of divergent
Page 32 and 33: I.1.F.b. Data that are concealed an
Page 34 and 35: of reforms deemed capable of settin
Page 36 and 37: or the ‘developing’ and ‘emer
Page 38 and 39: unemployment rate among young peopl
Page 40 and 41: as well as in Tunis. In addition, T
Page 42 and 43: conditions. In order to operate, th
Page 44 and 45: I.2.E. Managing supernumeraries by
Page 46 and 47: I.2.F.a. The confusion between disc
Page 48 and 49: their behaviour. Disciplinary power
Page 50 and 51: II.The reconfiguration of power,THE
Page 52 and 53: of the cumbersome bureaucratic mach
Page 54 and 55: II. 1. The uncertainty and the chan
Page 56 and 57: opposing or supporting the transiti
Page 58 and 59: a year, including all those who, wh
Page 60 and 61: factory for the Tunisian Chemical G
Page 62 and 63: Justice Program of the European Uni
Page 64 and 65: such zones, it is not only the natu
Page 66 and 67: II. 2. The stakes for a radical tra
Page 68 and 69: from 2000 and had opened the biddin
Page 70 and 71: II.2.A.d. The system of incentives
Page 72 and 73: Europeans are tackling this issue,
Page 74 and 75: has not stopped. Tunisians still ma
Page 76 and 77: The ambiguities are obvious and any
Page 78 and 79: II.2.B.b. How the bureaucracy works
Page 80 and 81: II.2.B.c. Taking into account the b
Page 84 and 85: construction of these arrangements,
Page 86 and 87: Conclusion86The current situation i
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