tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C YIt is important at this juncture to clear up a misunderstanding. The transitional government ledby Béji Caïd Essebsi often mentions its lack of legitimacy to explain its inaction, the preferencefor stability and continuity, and, at all events, the absence of clear guidelines and concreteproposals – something about which foreign partners, beginning with the European Union,complain bitterly. Given their option to intervene, which makes them dependent on demandsexpressly made ​by Tunisia and on the definition of clearly expressed strategies, intervention ontheir part is often blocked. If we can understand that a major tax reform is not to be implementedbefore the elections, this argument still seems to correspond more closely to a bureaucraticand political excuse than to a real lack of legitimacy. Who could be against measures thattake into account some of the demands of the population that rose in revolt? Who couldprotest against policies promoting major public works or works of public utility, especially inthe regions? And why would thinking about how to reorient the economy so as to integratemore people and give them better conditions be less acceptable that the decision, taken inhaste and without consultation, to create positions in the civil service or increase civil servicesalaries by 15%? On the contrary, a transitional government could have a greater capacity forreflection on, and implementation of, innovative policies: consisting of ‘interim’ officials (sincethe rule for participating in the Caïd Essebsi government was that its members would not standin the forthcoming elections), the latter are not bound by campaign promises, by the need toplease at all costs and generate consensus. The government might thus have been able toimplement a whole series of measures symbolizing a break with past practices, starting withthe introduction of checks and balances on power and procedures that promote compliancewith competition rules and transparency, and the independence of intermediary bodies andcontrolling institutions (starting with justice).It seems that the wait-and-see behaviour of the transitional government must be analyzedthrough another interpretative grid: not a lack of legitimacy, but an implicit political orientationthat fundamentally wants to remain in the path previously followed, a path that does indeedhave the disadvantage of generating a growing number of supernumeraries, but that also hasthe advantage, firstly, of respecting the major macroeconomic balances and the norms definedby the major funding partners (and thus ensure a good rating and preferential financing) and,secondly, of not upsetting the balance of power within the political economy of Tunisia. In otherwords, this withdrawal may also be interpreted as a refusal to take specific account of the socioeconomicsprings of the revolutionary movement, which sought at once to better integrate allTunisian actors into the societal dynamics, including those actors who were previously partiallyexcluded, and to defend the principles of dignity, respect and transparency. It can also beunderstood as a legacy: ways of thinking do not change immediately, and it is clear that thepre-eminence of planning, a bureaucratic operation that is hierarchical, disempowering andfussy, and centralized decision-making are all a brake on the renewal of economic strategiesand modes of government. Similarly, operating by consensus (a consensus partly constructed,it goes without saying), as was characteristic of the reformist ethos in action over the last fiftyyears and more particularly in the Ben Ali period, has not been questioned: the quest for aunanimity that is clearly unobtainable the minute the constraint of fear and the choice ofsilence have disappeared, prevents any decision from being made.53The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy