tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C YOn the one hand, it is amazing that after giving the press the ‘real’ unemployment figures,the government re-uses the official data drawn up prior to the revolution. Thus, despitethe disputes around unemployment statistics, the provisional government sticks as in thepast to official data - less worrying but already alarming - supplied before January 14.Similarly, public discourse tones down the difficulties faced by the post-revolutionaryTunisian economy, with immediate effect in terms of job losses from the collapse oftourism and the civil war in Libya. In continuity with the past, this is simultaneously a desirenot to present too gloomy a picture of the Tunisian economy and a difficulty in facingreality in its social and political consequences.On the other hand, and more importantly, the ‘active employment policy’ is surprisinglyclose to previous policies characterized more by their ability to camouflage the realstatistics than by their impact in terms of integration into the Tunisian economy. Before 14January, this policy was based primarily on delaying tactics designed mainly to reducethe recognition of job seekers. Thus, after completing their studies, young people wereless motivated to find a job than to go to a job centre. Formed in the early 2000s as onestopcentres, these provided them with advice and support. 93 They thus gained accessto internships, to the financing - by the Tunisian Solidarity Bank - of various projects due tocheap credit extending over 10 or 15 years, to aid in the creation of small companies, andto professional training programs. In 2000, the National Employment Fund was created tohelp young people to train, reintegrate and re-qualify for the labour market. The courseson ‘Introduction to working life’ had been developed for those with a master’s degree(SIVP1) or the baccalaureate (SIVP2), so they could be temporarily recruited at verylow wages - less than the minimum wage - by public or private companies, publiclyfunded. We can also here mention the introduction of employment-training contractsand funds for integration and vocational adaptation. Employment workshops offeredyoung people occupation in return for financial compensation, about 60 TD for 15 days’workshop, i.e. 4 TD per day. Increasingly used in rural areas, they offered a supplementto family income and were an attempt to limit the rural exodus. 94 De facto, all thesemeasures failed to bring these young people into working life as is suggested by theunemployment figures revealed in the aftermath of 14 January or the World Bank reportsmentioned above; they were primarily intended to reduce the rate of unemploymentand guarantee a living wage for young people.The measures proposed today are strikingly similar to the previous ones. The system forallocating allowances to unemployed graduates remains ambiguous. The AMEL (Hope)program, announced by the provisional government on 22 February 2011, is meant toenable unemployed graduates of higher education to benefit from training courses andinternships in specialties defined by the labour market, in return for 200 dinars per monthfor one year. The conditions for obtaining them are very restrictive, and they actuallyexclude graduates who have already made ​contributions to social security for over5793 For all these measures, see A. Bédoui, ‘Spécificités et limites du modèle de développement tunisien’,communication to the colloquium on Démocratie, développement, dialogue social, organised by theUGTT in Tunis, November 2004, and the official press and websites.94 The number of jobs on the shop floor rose from 500,000 to 1.2 million in 5 years. Source: MEF.The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy