tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C Yconceived by the previous teams and formalized in the NIP. The fundamental choiceof flexibility is followed even if it faces a few cyclical hitches, regarded as inevitablebut also as transient and marginal. Ultimately, this statement, these proposals andthe few measures taken do not raise the fundamental question, asked earlier aboutthe economic ‘miracle’ of Tunisia: the question of the overall shape of the Tunisianeconomy. The problem is not that of the increased flexibility of work - already very greatin practice, even though the laws and the formal rules may seem to leave a certain‘rigidity’ in place - but the problem, rather, of the economic model, the structure andfunctioning of the productive apparatus, the political economy of Tunisia (see below,II.2.A).II.1.C.c. A hazy strategy of short-term recoveryIn the short term, there is no doubt that only the Keynesian policy for recovery cancope with the increasing difficulties and demands of those who have sustained theunrest. Apart from recruitment policies in the civil service and the improvement in socialprotection mentioned above, this Keynesian policy finds classic form in a policy oflarger or smaller public works and rapid, ​small investments in public services. The Essebsigovernment seems, however, to have trouble defining such a strategy. Aid to needyfamilies and job seekers is still pathetic and does not in the slightest alter the situation ofthese populations; it remains mainly defined, as we have seen, by the old paradigm ofconditioning, control and waiting (and not integration into the labour market), unableto play a part in any recovery. The same is true of aid to firms deemed to favour hiring.It seems unrealistic that a delay in reporting business profits or taking over part of theemployers’ contribution for new recruits should succeed in boosting the economy. Asfor regional development and investment incentives, these remain empty slogans. TheTunisian authorities have promised vague ‘budget allocations’ to ‘locally activate themechanisms of employment and social welfare’ and given themselves two extra monthsto proceed to a ‘significant reallocation of spending on priority zones and regions in thelight of the demands expressed by the regions’. 95 They encourage the ‘implementationof major projects’, especially in the field of new technologies…European emergency aid is partly dedicated to this type of short-term stimulus because10 of the 17 million euros of the instrument of stability must be dedicated to plans formicro-credit that will profit projects in the interior regions. But this amount, deemed‘ridiculous’ in Tunisia, 96 is indeed derisory in comparison with the needs and challengesof the recovery. In contrast, the EIB Bank is certainly in this area the most active of theEuropean authorities, less dependent on bureaucratic logics and the definition of reformsdefined by the Tunisian authorities, committing far more significant sums. In fact, the EIBhas announced a budget of 1.87 billion euros to fund economic programss focused ongrowth and employment, and its board of directors has already approved two majorprojects, already set up but as yet unrealized, namely the construction of the new Mdhilla5995 Prime Minister’s speech presenting the social and economic program on 8 April 2011.96 Statement by the Minister for Industry, Afif Chelbi, on 17 February 2011. We heard these remarksthroughout our mission in Tunisia.The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy