tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

has not stopped. Tunisians still managed to leave the territory, organizing crossings of theMediterranean by taking longer trips, especially via Libya, slipping into the holds of shipsand into the containers of goods for export. The huge influx of Tunisians since February2011, taking advantage of the relaxation of Tunisian border police control, suggests thepotential of this momentum, that only a radical transformation of the economic modelcan slow down.The purely repressive policy in European countries is doomed to failure. From one point ofview it leads to violations of the elementary principles of human rights. From an economicand financial standpoint, it only fuels tension in a model already running out of steam.From a practical standpoint, it is neither tenable nor realistic. This is the lesson of pastpractices that have actually resulted in a hardening of measures in the legal arsenal tomeet the ‘requirements’ of its partners while taking into account its own specific issues.Lawmaking has allowed the government to vaunt, in front of its partners and donors,its commitment to fight illegal emigration effectively and to ‘manage migration’. Thegovernment’s commitment was assessed by its European partners primarily in terms of itslegislation, and thus benefited from the high marks given by foreign partners to the TunisiaBen Ali. Indeed, European partners and donors in general look, above all, at the formalproceedings, the legislative or administrative structures, when assessing their partnersin the south; they do not check the practical and concrete implementation of thecommitments made. 130 The same applies in migration policy as in economic policy: evenif they may argue about the quality and presentation of economic data, donors look firstat the apparent results (respect for fundamental balances, for example). They appreciateTunisia’s unhesitating commitment to ‘reforms’ whose reality is gauged in terms of overallaggregates: the number of non-tariff barriers removed, the number of lowered customstariffs, the quantitative reduction of the share of SOEs in the economy, the number ofprices and margins which are no longer controlled, progress in the convertibility of thedinar and foreign exchange management, the number of laws adopted... that areobserved. They do not look at the set of practices that are actually implemented ​aroundthese measures and that may completely change their meaning. Lawmaking has alsohelped increase the extent of the repressive legal framework on whose basis the Tunisianauthorities could monitor any sensitive activity. In so doing they created more crime sincethey broadened the scope of illegality, helping to render entire sectors of the population,including young people, vulnerable.74Given these contradictions, the economic aid proposed by Europe will not change thingsmuch in the short term, unless the economic model is fundamentally rethought. Again, theexperience of recent years suggests as much. The government headed by Ben Ali anddirected by Mohamed Ghannouchi had mobilized a discourse on the need for economicdevelopment so as to engage European partners in the North and convince them thatTunisia could not police their southern borders alone without their economic support.130 Béatrice Hibou, ‘Economie politique du discours de la Banque mondiale en Afrique: du catéchismeéconomique au fait (et méfait) missionnaire’, Les Etudes du CERI, n°39, March 1998 and ‘Les marges demanœuvre d’un “bon élève” économique’.