tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

The ambiguities are obvious and any misunderstandings may not have much impact. Thegovernment of Caïd Essebsi is clear in its guidelines: part of the solution to the economiccrisis will come from emigration. Hence its many initiatives to try to reach agreementsthat place the Tunisian workforce in Western countries or to renegotiate the labouragreements already existing. But Europe is just as clear in its determination to stand firm.II.2.B. Modes of governmentThe issue is huge and we cannot here mention more than the main aspects, but it is fundamentalsince feelings of injustice and inequality have also been fuelled by these practices. So our reportcannot go over all the ways in which power has been exercised in Tunisia over the last decades.We will, however, note the main ways, those which incur conflict and lie at the heart of therelations of force that have emerged from the new political situation.76II.2.B.a. ClientelismFirst and foremost, party patronage has structured all relations between the authoritiesand the population, in political life but also, in an area of interest to us here, in economicand social life. The disappearance of the RCD does not affect the sociability and themodes of operation by networks that helped to anchor the state, the governmentand the party in society, but which simultaneously drew the lines of exclusion andinequality. The revolutionary moment aims to question this pre-eminence, but nothing isdefinite as such structured networks are advantaged relative to diffuse demands thatare relatively widespread but poorly organized. Conflicts between politicians assumeclassic shapes, such the resistance in government or the sabotage of initiatives by theinstrumentalisation of certain categories of the patronage network. Such is the case,for example, in Grombalia where the RCD town authorities resists the committee for theprotection of the revolution by giving trading licenses to ‘big shots’ or encouraging therefuse collectors to strike. 135 These moves reflect the destabilization strategies introducedby the local elites of the RCD to intimidate those most involved in the citizens’ movementto protect the revolution. This scare tactic is coupled with clientelist solicitude expressedby the creation of associations financed by the entrepreneurs of that region in order toconsolidate the networks of activists or at least prevent the capture of their electoralbase. 136 The dissolution of the RCD, following a court decision, has not however led to thedisappearance of its social roots and its capacity to manipulate networks at the locallevel, as evidenced by their hasty reaction in sheltering party assets liable to seizure.The situation here is confused and plural, depending on local power relations. In somesituations, the committees to protect the revolution have been able to recover RCDpremises, whilst in others they have been illegally occupied by families close to the formerruling party, with this appropriation of premises then being presented as spontaneous. 137In doing so, local elites are gradually reinvesting the public space, despite the corruptionscandals that they are accused of. Local political manoeuvring is marked by a kind of135 Interviews and participant observation, Grombalia, March 2011.136 Ibid.137 Fieldwork, Tunisia, March 2011 and press follow-up with data on social networks.