tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C Yfunctionality of a discourse that is currently focused on corruption, which calls into questionneither the economic model, nor the modes of government. Restoration can be achievedonly by macroeconomic stabilization, by getting Tunisians back to work, and by gaining accessto the external financing needed in the management of social conflict and the regainingof political control. Thus, the social and economic program launched in early April 2011 isintroduced by the imperative of ‘security’ (considered as the first step, both economic andsocial) while this document concludes with a ‘solemn appeal to the Tunisian people to workhard’ and a vigorous critique of ‘exaggerated promises’. 92 By perpetuating and strengtheningthis tradition that stigmatizes conflict and glorifies consensus, the current Tunisian authorities arereproducing forms of government that have a strong elective affinity with a disciplinary andnormalizing conception of power.It is a good idea to recall how this preference for stability is shared by Europeans, from theBarcelona Declaration to the specific instruments of intervention in crisis situations (specificallycalled ‘stability instrument’). It is a good idea from the political point of view: in the aftermath of14 January, Europeans have largely supported Mohamed Ghannouchi in the name of stabilityand the desire to find a safe and recognized conversation partner at the earliest opportunity. Itis also a good idea from an economic point of view: in general, donors - including the EuropeanUnion - base their argument for stability on economic factors; it is a matter of attractingforeign investment, enabling further growth thanks to confidence in the markets, participatingin international stability, and so on. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on the obvious: theevocation of stability, security, and ‘public order’ is instrumental and allows any kind of intrusioninto social life, beginning with political repression of which it is an invariant factor.II.1.B.Political life: the primacy of short-term strategic considerationsIn a revolutionary situation, the political comes first. The opposite would, by definition, bedangerous, meaning that it had been pre-emptied by some elements while others wereexcluded. However, the economic and the political cannot be separated (we will return tothis at length below), and the political finds expression in various topics. Now what is strikingabout the current situation is that the economic and social dimension of the movement thatcarried out ​the revolution (a political movement, in other words) is, so to speak, marginalized. Forthe different political parties as for the government, these economic and social considerationsare set out hazily, with general statements regarding the consideration of economic andsocial problems, but without any analysis of the origin of this situation, systematic critiques ofpast options, or concrete proposals to address socio-economic demands in depth. In termsof proposals and even strategic ideas, these considerations remain secondary in the faceof the resurgence of the debate on secularism and the place of religion in society, arousedsimultaneously by the political elite of what is now called the ‘ancien régime’ and by the oldsecular opposition representing so-called civil society. They also and above all remain marginalin comparison with the quest for a better position on the political chessboard, tactics of allianceand opposition, considerations on strategies for winning influence on the political scene,5592 All these quotations come from the Prime Minister’s speech presenting the social and economicprogram on 8 April 2011.The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy