tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

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II.2.B.b. How the bureaucracy works: between party allegiance, distancingand centralizationThe Tunisian administration since independence has been highly politicized, followingthe model of a perfect correspondence between administrative structure and partystructure: to have a responsible position and rise in rank, one had to swear allegianceto the party, in other words be a member or bow to the demands of the politicalsphere and the party hierarchy. To the extent that the law, still in force, stipulates thatone must have attained a particular rank in the administration to gain access to aparticular position of responsibility, and above all insofar as the decision has beenmade to emphasise stability, bureaucratic continuity, ‘moderation’ and the avoidanceof conflict, any renewal of senior management cannot be achieved. Specifically, keypositions and leadership positions are still in the hands of people linked to the RCD orwho, in any case, have been ‘formatted’ by the old system. Under these conditions, onecan sometimes see real resistance being organized, as shown by the drawing up of listsof new governors, sub-prefects or delegates; one most often finds the reproductionof prickly behaviours, sensitive to orders from above, including those in breach of thelegal stipulations. 142 Locally, different situations are widely divergent: some municipalitieshave been dismantled, while others have remained completely in the hands of RCDmembers. But whatever the configuration, the power of these authorities is now virtuallynonexistent in terms of administrative work and economic and social life, since politicalconflicts are so powerful and widespread. As for governors, coming from the previousadministrative and party hierarchy, they are often paralyzed by the tensions and evenhostility towards them, and share a bureaucratic ethos that lessens their desire to showany initiative in this period of uncertainty. This situation is problematic insofar as localauthorities are not playing their role as a link with the population, especially in the poorestareas where expectations are huge. Under these conditions, the state still appears justas distant from the population, remote, hierarchical and unattainable. In this respect, thesuccessive transitional governments, including the third government under Caïd Essebsi,are entirely in line with previous governments. It is striking that neither the Prime Ministernor any other minister have gone out to marginalized areas or have visited the families ofmartyrs. Even at the local level, these families or the families of people injured in cities likeSidi Bouzid and Kasserine, the places most heavily affected by the violence of repression,have still not been received by the Governor. No structure for listening to, analysingand gathering people’s demands has been established, while the situations are oftendramatic. Distancing oneself from authoritarian modes of government requires a wholeapprenticeship and a series of changes in political and administrative behaviour that willnecessarily take time.78142 Interviews, Tunis, March 2011. This was also openly revealed by the former Interior Minister, Farhat Rajhi,who also disclosed that he had himself been caught out by his administration, which had drawn up thelist of officials to be appointed and promoted.
T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U A R Y A N D I T S S O C I A L A N D P O L I T I C A L E C O N O M YT H E I S S U E S A T S T A K E I N A R E C O N F I G U R A T I O N O F E U R O P E A N P O L I C YAnother constraint on the democratisation of forms of government lies in the extremecentralization of the administration and more broadly of the modes of government. Thebreak with the dualist administration of the territory is a highly political issue that goesbeyond the economic sphere to the foundations of citizenship. As suggested by HabibDlala in his column in La Presse, ‘the land issue should not be reduced to the mode ofregulation of an economic development open to the world economy. It should be astrategic choice responding to the legitimate aspirations of populations of all regions.The design and implementation of programs and projects should reflect the shift froma hierarchical mode of government to a participatory mode of governance for theproduction of social effects and the guaranteeing of equal opportunities among citizensand between territorial entities.’ 143 The necessary transformation cannot come aboutmerely through the dissolution of the RCD. It goes without saying that the situation isa result of the combination of far more complex factors and that this argument failsbecause the coastal and northern regions have also been governed the same way. Theabsence of any consideration of the specific features of regions in the elaboration ofdevelopment policy is also explained by the fact that the latter obey the requirementsof sectors and techniques defined at the central level. There are actually no indicatorsconstructed from any consideration of the realities of each region in building a policy fordevelopment 144 . Similarly, development choices are not based on any strategic study, noron any pattern of development that would take into account the needs of each region.In reality, the party’s mechanisms of surveillance and the political logics of control andof the population have certainly stifled the problems of development in inner regions.However, the focus on the hegemony of the RCD obscures the real issues around thedevelopment of these regions: the centralized and politicized administration of theeconomy and the political mainsprings of a differential management of the territory thathas resulted over the years in a real regional divide. While the ‘useful’ regions were thetarget of investments and helpful interventions, poverty-stricken areas were left to thelogic of laissez-faire and tolerance of illegality. 145 It is striking to note that the 2011 draftbudget of the last Ben Ali government had set aside 18% of the budget to the inlandareas, as against 82% to coastal regions. 146143 Habib Dlala, ‘L’urgence d’une réflexion collective sur le développement et l’aménagement duterritoire tunisien’, La Presse, 11.4.2011.144 As mentioned by Minister Abderrazek Zouari quoted in ‘Tunisie : Abderrazek Zouari face aux maux dudéveloppement régional’, webmanagercenter, 12 avril 2011145 Hamza Meddeb, ‘La Tunisie, un pays émergent?’, and Béatrice Hibou, Anatomie politique de ladomination (Paris: La Découverte, 2011), ch. 8.146 According to Minister Zouari’s declarations in ‘Tunisie: Abderrazek Zouari face aux maux dudéveloppement régional’, webmanagercenter, 12 April 2011.79The reconfiguration of power, the socio-economicchallenges of the revolution, and European policy
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TUNISIA AFTER 14 JANUARY AND ITSSOC
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This document has been produced wit
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T U N I S I A A F T E R 1 4 J A N U
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E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r yMADE
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An alarming socio-economic situatio
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In public debate, the analysis of c
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half between conceptualization and
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I N T R O D U C T I o nMADE by Euro
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More specifically the report is an
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I. The rhetoric of ‘stability’
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I . 1 . T h e m o d e s o f c o n s
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Page 30 and 31: I.1.E.The concealment of divergent
Page 32 and 33: I.1.F.b. Data that are concealed an
Page 34 and 35: of reforms deemed capable of settin
Page 36 and 37: or the ‘developing’ and ‘emer
Page 38 and 39: unemployment rate among young peopl
Page 40 and 41: as well as in Tunis. In addition, T
Page 42 and 43: conditions. In order to operate, th
Page 44 and 45: I.2.E. Managing supernumeraries by
Page 46 and 47: I.2.F.a. The confusion between disc
Page 48 and 49: their behaviour. Disciplinary power
Page 50 and 51: II.The reconfiguration of power,THE
Page 52 and 53: of the cumbersome bureaucratic mach
Page 54 and 55: II. 1. The uncertainty and the chan
Page 56 and 57: opposing or supporting the transiti
Page 58 and 59: a year, including all those who, wh
Page 60 and 61: factory for the Tunisian Chemical G
Page 62 and 63: Justice Program of the European Uni
Page 64 and 65: such zones, it is not only the natu
Page 66 and 67: II. 2. The stakes for a radical tra
Page 68 and 69: from 2000 and had opened the biddin
Page 70 and 71: II.2.A.d. The system of incentives
Page 72 and 73: Europeans are tackling this issue,
Page 74 and 75: has not stopped. Tunisians still ma
Page 76 and 77: The ambiguities are obvious and any
Page 80 and 81: II.2.B.c. Taking into account the b
Page 82 and 83: diminishing trickle. At the nationa
Page 84 and 85: construction of these arrangements,
Page 86 and 87: Conclusion86The current situation i
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