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tunisia after 14 january and its social and political economy - Refworld

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from 2000 <strong>and</strong> had opened the bidding to foreign companies so as to compensate forthe weakness of FDIs.This situation undoubtedly reflects a weakening of the offshore sector <strong>and</strong>, more generally,a blocking of the dual development model. The development in recent years of callcentres (involving as they do remote <strong>and</strong> outsourced relations between a company <strong>and</strong><strong>its</strong> customers) in Tunisia is definitely to be included in an attempt to reproduce the dualisticeconomic structure by extending offshore activities to the service <strong>economy</strong>. However, thisredeployment was essentially carried out on ‘low’ segments of the international rangeof specialization, segments which are not strong in technology <strong>and</strong> knowledge transfer<strong>and</strong> requiring ‘cheap’ graduate labour. This segment led to the creation of 10,000 to15,000 jobs, <strong>and</strong> embodies the phenomenon of proletarianization of graduates <strong>and</strong> thereproduction of ‘downmarket’ international specialization. 115Faced with this situation, the position of European institutions seems to be extremelyambiguous. Experts implicitly emphasize the lim<strong>its</strong> of the model, noting the qualificationrequirements, the need for more adequate training <strong>and</strong> employment, the indispensableimprovement of the education system, the need for improved infrastructure, thetransformation of the incentive scheme to make it less favourable to unskilled work, <strong>and</strong>so on. The need to go upmarket <strong>and</strong> increase the added value created is recognized.But, firstly, European economic cooperation depends on the reforms set out by theTunisian authorities that, as we have seen, favour stability <strong>and</strong> continuity, being moreconcerned with elections <strong>and</strong> their positioning on the <strong>political</strong> chessboard than by theneed to respond to the requests of those who brought about the revolution <strong>and</strong> areexpress their dem<strong>and</strong> for integration. These reforms, technical though they appear, arehighly <strong>political</strong> <strong>and</strong> can only be defined by the Tunisians. In this context, Europe canhave only marginal influence on the overall direction of the economic model. Secondly,European businesses <strong>and</strong> consumers are the primary beneficiaries of this specializationin international subcontracting, in industry or services, based on flexibility <strong>and</strong> low pay. Itis hard to see the European Union going against this international division of labour, ofwhich it is one of the initiators <strong>and</strong> one of the beneficiaries, <strong>and</strong> which is also a directresult of the liberalism it promotes.68115 Hamza Meddeb, ‘Tunisie, pays émergent?’

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