28maximum allowable plot ratio — if <strong>the</strong> owner wishes onlyto refurbish a lower-rise building, this means he must stillpay a premium for floorspace that he does not intend tobuild.Lease conversion premiums have been an especially severeproblem for obsolete industrial buildings. The migration <strong>of</strong>industries to <strong>the</strong> Mainland since <strong>the</strong> 1980s left behind about1.4 million m 2 <strong>of</strong> underutilized industrial space by <strong>the</strong> end<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> year 2000. 83 For comparison, Hong Kong’s entirestock <strong>of</strong> commercial <strong>of</strong>fice space was about 10.5 million m 2(113 million square feet) at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 2009. 84 Because <strong>of</strong>lease restrictions, this industrial space could not be legallyconverted to o<strong>the</strong>r uses without payment <strong>of</strong> a premiumeven though <strong>the</strong> Planning Department had rezoned manylots to “O<strong>the</strong>r Specified Uses (Business)” under <strong>the</strong> OZP.In 2002, as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> background research for <strong>the</strong> HongKong 2030 Planning and Vision Study, a pilot study wasdone on <strong>the</strong> hypo<strong>the</strong>tical conversion <strong>of</strong> two industrialbuildings to l<strong>of</strong>t apartments in Ma Tau Kok and YauTong. It conservatively estimated <strong>the</strong> land premiums to be17% and 5% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total development cost respectively,rendering land premiums <strong>the</strong> “make or break” factordetermining whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> projects would be financiallyviable or not. 85 This study was conducted during a marketdownturn, and in stronger market conditions, landpremiums can be expected to be much higher. A privatesector planner and surveyor interviewed for this projecteach informally estimated premiums at up to 40% to 50%<strong>of</strong> total development costs. 86 One expert said that this iswhy <strong>the</strong>re have been “virtually no cases <strong>of</strong> modification fora change <strong>of</strong> use from industrial to <strong>of</strong>fice while retaining <strong>the</strong>existing buildings”. 87For many years, experts have been urging lease modificationpremium reform. In 1991-1992, a Special Committeeon Compensation and Betterment was appointed toreview Hong Kong’s town planning system. It addressed<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> lease modification premiums, and suggestedits replacement with a more uniform and fairly-appliedbetterment (redevelopment) tax. 88 The Special Committeealso suggested gradually disentangling lease developmentconditions from <strong>the</strong> statutory planning system by stipulatingthat all lease development conditions apply to <strong>the</strong> originalbuilding only, so that after redevelopment buildings wouldbe governed only by <strong>the</strong> statutory OZP and <strong>the</strong> BuildingsRegulations. The Special Committee’s suggestions werenever implemented.In 2003, <strong>the</strong> Hong Kong Institute <strong>of</strong> Surveyors suggesteda number <strong>of</strong> simpler reforms in order to stimulate urbanrenewal and economic investment in <strong>the</strong> wake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SARSdownturn, including special financial incentives or a basic25%-50% discount on all lease modification premiums. 89These were not implemented at <strong>the</strong> time ei<strong>the</strong>r.While Hong Kong’s government has been reluctant tooverhaul <strong>the</strong> land premium system, it has at various times<strong>of</strong>fered temporary concessions to modification premiums(as well as o<strong>the</strong>r land premiums and land taxes) 90 in responseto extreme economic circumstances. For example, during<strong>the</strong> late 1960s and early 1970s, <strong>the</strong> government reducedlease modification premiums by 50% to revive a depressedmarket caused by bank runs in 1965 followed by <strong>the</strong> riots<strong>of</strong> 1966 and 1967. 91In his 2009-2010 policy address, Chief Executive DonaldTsang <strong>of</strong>fered temporary measures intended to encourageredevelopment or conversion <strong>of</strong> old industrial buildings.Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se measures appear to provide incentives formore environmentally-friendly choices.Firstly, he proposed to lower <strong>the</strong> threshold for compulsorysale for redevelopment for industrial buildings located inre-zoned industrial areas (see section on multi-ownershipfor fur<strong>the</strong>r explanation). Secondly, he suggested linkingpremiums to redevelopment density on a “pay for what youbuild” approach, so that instead <strong>of</strong> automatically assessingpremiums based on <strong>the</strong> maximum development potential,a developer could pay less for building a smaller building orretaining an old one. Thirdly, he proposed that industriallease modification premiums could be paid in installmentsover a five-year period. Fourthly, he proposed that ownerswho convert <strong>the</strong>ir buildings instead <strong>of</strong> redeveloping <strong>the</strong>mcould be exempt from change <strong>of</strong> land use waiver fees. 92The latter three proposals — those having to do with landpremiums — will only be applicable for three years, from2010 to 2013. 93 In January 2010, <strong>the</strong> government set upa team to process conversion applications with <strong>the</strong> goal<strong>of</strong> putting <strong>the</strong> new policy into practice by April. 94 Theseproposals do not apply to non-industrial buildings, andit remains to be seen whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se pilot measures will berenewed upon <strong>the</strong>ir expiration.Lease modification premium reform is both an economicallyand politically fraught issue, explaining <strong>the</strong> reluctance <strong>of</strong>successive administrations to implement fundamental andpermanent reforms. With <strong>the</strong> government so dependenton land revenues, cancelling or lowering modificationpremiums (which accounted for 57% <strong>of</strong> land revenuesin 2001-2002) 95 would mean forgoing a large amount <strong>of</strong>income. While this would be partially <strong>of</strong>fset by a growthin revenue from rates (property taxes), 96 o<strong>the</strong>r taxes wouldstill need to be raised elsewhere. This would be extremelypolitically difficult given <strong>the</strong> narrowness <strong>of</strong> Hong Kong’sexisting tax base — in 2006, only 35% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> workingpopulation paid salaries tax while <strong>the</strong> top-earning 800out <strong>of</strong> 750,000 registered companies paid 60% <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>itstax. 97 Moreover, suddenly freeing up such a large number<strong>of</strong> old industrial buildings for redevelopment or conversionwould cause property prices to plummet, triggering arecession. Although this would lead to a more competitiveand diversified economy in <strong>the</strong> long run, it would stillbe very painful in <strong>the</strong> short run, especially for domesticproperty owners finding <strong>the</strong>mselves in negative equity. 98And because it would remove a major barrier to entry for
smaller developers, it would probably be opposed by largedevelopers currently benefiting from <strong>the</strong> status quo. 99Making <strong>the</strong> URA premium-exempt was a way to sidestep<strong>the</strong> premium problem ra<strong>the</strong>r than to tackle it directly.Instead <strong>of</strong> freeing up <strong>the</strong> market, <strong>the</strong> URA would simplytake on <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> urban renewal itself. Yet <strong>the</strong> URA wasnot granted a broad mandate to redevelop underutilizedindustrial buildings, but was targeted mainly at residentialand commercial mixed-use areas where lease restrictions areless <strong>of</strong> an issue due to many leases in <strong>the</strong> old urban corebeing unrestricted.Although <strong>the</strong> Planning Department’s 1996 Urban RenewalStrategy Study (which preceded <strong>the</strong> 2001 URS) addressed<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> industrial buildings, 100 it took a limitedapproach whereby <strong>the</strong> URA would only directly redevelopindustrial buildings when it was able to bundle <strong>the</strong>m withadjacent residential ones, while facilitating private sectorredevelopment elsewhere. As <strong>of</strong> June 2010, only one projectin Sai Wan Ho (H14) involves <strong>the</strong> redevelopment <strong>of</strong> anindustrial building. 101 Reasons given for this comparativelyhands-<strong>of</strong>f approach were vague, but seemed to indicate areluctance to displace <strong>the</strong> few remaining industries relyingon inexpensive factory space. 102Land premiums are possibly <strong>the</strong> most important factorcontributing to market failure in urban renewal, but <strong>the</strong>yare not <strong>the</strong> only factor. There are many o<strong>the</strong>r contributingreasons, only some <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> government has attemptedto address. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are related in some way to HongKong’s unusual land tenure system and its high land pricepolicy.The Problem <strong>of</strong>Multi-OwnershipOne <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most commonly cited barriers to privateredevelopment is <strong>the</strong> multi-ownership <strong>of</strong> buildings. HongKong’s land shortage, which forced <strong>the</strong> city to developvertically, means that most buildings are held under multiownership.The specific form <strong>of</strong> multi-ownership mostcommon in Hong Kong is that <strong>of</strong> undivided shares, whichmeans that each person who buys a flat in a building acquiresa share in <strong>the</strong> apartment building and <strong>the</strong> exclusive rightto use <strong>the</strong> flat. They also acquire a share in <strong>the</strong> building’scommon areas and are thus obligated to contribute to <strong>the</strong>irmaintenance.This form <strong>of</strong> land ownership emerged in 1931 when <strong>the</strong>economic depression left many flats vacant. In order toaddress this problem, <strong>the</strong> government began to charge ratesaccording to rented flats instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole land lot. AfterWorld War II, multiple-ownership by tenants-in-commonbecame <strong>the</strong> dominant form <strong>of</strong> land ownership as it becameincreasingly unaffordable for a single individual to ownan entire lot. This was legally recognized in 1956. Thegovernment also enacted <strong>the</strong> Law <strong>of</strong> Property (Enforcement<strong>of</strong> Covenants) Ordinance to put into place buildingcovenants to govern <strong>the</strong> maintenance and management <strong>of</strong>buildings among residents. 103This meant that any owner seeking to redevelop a plot mustgain <strong>the</strong> agreement and cooperation <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r owners.A developer seeking to buy a building for redevelopmentmust purchase each unit in <strong>the</strong> building individually. Thismade <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> land assembly in built-up areas a longand difficult process, unattractive to most developers who areprimarily interested in quick returns. A developer wishing tobuy out an old block must first attempt to predict <strong>the</strong> finalsale price after redevelopment depending on <strong>the</strong> forecastedprice per square foot multiplied by <strong>the</strong> gross developablefloor area. It must <strong>the</strong>n estimate <strong>the</strong> construction costs,pr<strong>of</strong>essional fees, land premium and interest. From <strong>the</strong>re, itworks backwards to find <strong>the</strong> maximum amount it can <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>the</strong> current owners, leaving enough for a pr<strong>of</strong>it margin.However, owners may demand more compensation —especially <strong>the</strong> last few remaining ones. Ano<strong>the</strong>r barrier toredevelopment has been <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> missing or defectivetitles which prevent buyers from completing a transaction.In light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se obstacles, few investors have <strong>the</strong> longtermvision to engage in projects that may not yield greatreturns until many years later. 104 One major exception is <strong>the</strong>entertainment entrepreneur Allan Zeman, who spent twodecades buying up properties in Lan Kwai Fong and growingit into Hong Kong’s most prominent bar and restaurantdistrict — his business model involved <strong>the</strong> modification <strong>of</strong>existing buildings and <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> ground flooruses, enabling him to sidestep <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> having to buyevery unit. 105 The typical developer, however, is primarilyinterested in acquiring a site, redeveloping it, and selling iton as quickly as possible.The government has made some progress in ameliorating<strong>the</strong> barriers posed by multi-ownership. The Land(Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, passedin 1999, enabled purchasers who have acquired 90% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>shares in a lot to compel <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest through <strong>the</strong>Lands Tribunal. It has proved useful in instances where <strong>the</strong>last remaining owners were holding a developer to ransom,such as in Swire’s redevelopment <strong>of</strong> industrial buildings inTaikoo Shing. 106 However, it has not been <strong>the</strong> panacea itwas hoped to be. In May 2009, <strong>the</strong> Development Bureaureported that since <strong>the</strong> law’s passage only 19 applicationshad been carried out. 107In January 2010, LegCo passed an amendment to <strong>the</strong>Ordinance lowering <strong>the</strong> threshold to 80% for buildingsover 50 years old (or 30 years old for industrial buildings)with fewer than ten owners. The reforms walked a delicate29
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102Comprehensive redevelopment disp
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104Luxury shopping at the K11 mall
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106A building rehabilitated by the
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112Wan Chai Market. Built in 1937,
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Appendix 1Name of projectAddress/lo
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Name of projectAddress/locationArea
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126Endnotes1 HKSAR Planning Departm
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128110 Chan, B. W. (2002), “The h
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Room 701, Hoseinee House,69 Wyndham