46Hussey <strong>and</strong> Doversassessment approach2. river basin management3. a strategy for elimination <strong>of</strong> pollution bydangerous substances4. public information <strong>and</strong> consultation5. the use <strong>of</strong> financial instruments.As is obvious, there are many similaritiesbetween the European Union’s <strong>Water</strong> FrameworkDirective <strong>and</strong> Australia’s National <strong>Water</strong>Initiative, not least in the fact that both entities,unlike the United States, have opted for anoverarching, federal framework for water resourcemanagement. Similarly, the power <strong>and</strong> influence <strong>of</strong>the environmental lobbies in achieving ecologicalobjectives can be seen in each, <strong>and</strong> the strengthenedrole <strong>of</strong> regional, catchment-based institutions isalso evident in both.However, an important difference between thetwo initiatives is the type <strong>of</strong> policy instrumentsadopted. Unlike Australia, the European Unionhas not pursued water trading, instead focusingon the “full cost recovery concept for determiningwater prices” which must, by definition, includeproduction as well as environmental <strong>and</strong> resourcecosts. This instrument clearly reflected theEuropean Union’s requirement that all policiesoperate according to both the polluter pays principle<strong>and</strong> the precautionary principle. The inclusion <strong>of</strong>the full cost-recovery principle was a coup for theenvironment lobby in the European Union, as thepowerful Council <strong>of</strong> Ministers had dem<strong>and</strong>ed it bedropped in the preparatory phase, to be replacedby an “adequate contribution” to the recovery <strong>of</strong>the costs <strong>of</strong> water services <strong>and</strong> further, policies thatprovide “adequate incentives for users to use waterresources efficiently” (Kaika 2003, Kaika <strong>and</strong>Page 2003). It should be noted, however, that theCouncil <strong>of</strong> Ministers did manage to “water down”the full cost recovery for water pricing principlesuch that member states are now only requiredto ensure that the price charged to consumers forfresh water <strong>and</strong> for the treatment <strong>of</strong> wastewaterwill “take into account” the full environmentalcosts (Page 2003).Three other issues are outst<strong>and</strong>ing in the <strong>Water</strong>Framework Directive <strong>and</strong> will pose considerabledifficulties in its implementation: first, it is unclearhow strict the penalties for non-compliance willbe, or how stringently any potential loopholesmay be tightened; second, while environmentalpolicy integration into other sectors <strong>of</strong> theeconomy is a mainstay <strong>of</strong> the European Union’s5th Environmental Action Program, it is unclear inthe document how the <strong>Water</strong> Framework Directivewill impact on the Common Agricultural Policy.Finally, there is speculation that the enormouscosts imposed on the member states to implementthe <strong>Water</strong> Framework Directive will force memberstates to outsource those costs to the private sector,with the result that water might become significantlymore privatized <strong>and</strong> thus “commodified,” despitethe Commission’s claims that “water is not acommercial product” (Kaika <strong>and</strong> Page 2003).Unlike in Australia <strong>and</strong> the European Union,the United States has not developed a nationalframework for the management <strong>of</strong> water resources.<strong>Water</strong> policy <strong>and</strong> law in the United States issignificantly fragmented with the eastern statespredominantly governed by the doctrine <strong>of</strong> riparianrights, while the western states have a systemthat treats water as a kind <strong>of</strong> private property orcommodity, known as prior appropriation. Thereis a third system known as regulated riparianismwhich shares characteristics with the Australianlegal system, whereby the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> waterrequires prior approval <strong>and</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> permits<strong>and</strong> licenses. There are a number <strong>of</strong> deficienciesin United States water law that have not beenaddressed at the national level, which is arguablywhy they are unlikely to be resolved in the nearfuture.First, there are jurisdictional barriers whichhave hindered attempts to successfully legislatefor both human <strong>and</strong> environmental needs in theUnited States to date (Arnold 2005). In particular,jurisdictional fragmentation exists both betweenlevels <strong>of</strong> government <strong>and</strong> within the same level<strong>of</strong> government. For instance, while most pointsourcepollution control is federal in originthrough the Environmental Protection Authority,the responsibility for regulating non-point sourcepollution lies in State h<strong>and</strong>s. Further, wetl<strong>and</strong>regulation is the province primarily <strong>of</strong> the UnitedStates Army Corps <strong>of</strong> Engineers, whereas theenforcement <strong>of</strong> the Endangered Species Act ininl<strong>and</strong> waters belongs to the United States Fish <strong>and</strong>UCOWRJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATION
Trajectories in Australian <strong>Water</strong> Policy47Wildlife Service. Moreover, while pollution law<strong>and</strong> the protection <strong>of</strong> biodiversity reside largelyin Federal h<strong>and</strong>s, water quantity, by contrast, isa matter <strong>of</strong> state law – <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> use managementis generally the domain <strong>of</strong> local government. AsAndreen (2006) warns, successive United Stateslegislators:have spent decades creating… separate legalsystems to govern l<strong>and</strong> use, water use <strong>and</strong> waterpollution, <strong>and</strong> it will take considerable effort todemonstrate to voters, economic interests, <strong>and</strong>decision-makers at all levels <strong>of</strong> governmentprecisely how l<strong>and</strong> use <strong>and</strong> water are inextricablyconnected throughout the whole <strong>of</strong> a watershed.Such jurisdictional fragmentation leads toa second significant problem <strong>of</strong> regulatoryfragmentation between water rights <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>rights. In the United States, there is a considerableproblem with coordination both vertically withrespect to Federal law, state water law, <strong>and</strong> locall<strong>and</strong> use management, <strong>and</strong> horizontally withrespect to the various agencies <strong>and</strong> political entitiesthat have responsibilities within each subject area.As in Australia, there have been attempts in theUnited States to overcome these jurisdictionalbarriers, including the public trust doctrine <strong>and</strong> theintroduction <strong>of</strong> environmental impact assessments.However, unlike in Australia <strong>and</strong> the EuropeanUnion—where environmental impact assessmentshave been incorporated into all state <strong>and</strong> memberstate legislation—in the United States it has onlybeen enacted into 15 state statutes (Andreen 2006),in addition to the Federal statute. In an effortto overcome this “multi-layered jurisdictionalpuzzle” there have been calls for the development<strong>of</strong> watershed institutions, much like the catchmentbasedinstitutions in the National <strong>Water</strong> Initiative<strong>and</strong> <strong>Water</strong> Framework Directive. However, to datethere has not been a comprehensive Federal pushfor this kind <strong>of</strong> regime change.There are, however, aspects <strong>of</strong> United Stateswater policy that are very similar to those <strong>of</strong> Australia<strong>and</strong> the European Union. The use <strong>of</strong> financialincentives or economic instruments is extensive inthe United States, <strong>and</strong> they are captured in Federal<strong>and</strong> state agri-enviromental schemes such as theconservation programs in the United States FarmBill, <strong>and</strong> vary in substance across the states. <strong>Water</strong>trading has been implemented in some states suchas California where water is scarce but there are nosuggestions that this would become national in extent.Indeed the extensive jurisdictional fragmentationacross levels <strong>of</strong> government would makethat particularly difficult. In the main, however,the United States policy style in the water domaincould be characterized on the one h<strong>and</strong> as administrativerationalism par excellence, <strong>and</strong> on the otherh<strong>and</strong> as economic rationalism owing to the choice<strong>of</strong> policy instruments, if not in terms <strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong>government.In relation to water quality, there is nationallegislation in the form <strong>of</strong> the Clean <strong>Water</strong> Act,although it is focused primarily on point-sourcepollution from industry <strong>and</strong> manufacturing. Fornon-point source pollution, such as that created byagriculture, the United States Congress instructedstates to develop water management plans but thepolicy was “watered down” such that it permittedthe states to use exclusively non-regulatoryavenues such as technical assistance, education,training, <strong>and</strong> demonstration projects to implementthe management plans (Andreen 2006). In UnitedStates agri-environment policy, dual emphasisis placed on both economic incentives, <strong>and</strong>participatory approaches to problem-solving.ConclusionThis paper has established that the apparent“framework” represented by Australia’s National<strong>Water</strong> Initiative—<strong>and</strong> by European Union <strong>and</strong>United States equivalents—contains unresolvedtensions:the dem<strong>and</strong> for a national, property-rights-basedwater management system <strong>and</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> theneed to hold Australia’s freshwater systems to“environmentally sustainable levels <strong>of</strong> extraction”have resulted in a framework that is weakened byunresolved tensions between the two (Connell etal. 2005).This should not surprise, as framework policies,especially in federal systems <strong>and</strong> in complexpolicy domains such as water, by definition are theproduct <strong>of</strong> political compromise, accommodatingthe aspirations <strong>of</strong> multiple players. The danger liesin forgetting that unresolved differences <strong>and</strong> discoursesremain to be negotiated during implementation <strong>of</strong>the policy, <strong>and</strong> in the construction <strong>and</strong> maintenance<strong>of</strong> water management arrangements consistent withJOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WATER RESEARCH & EDUCATIONUCOWR
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