Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leone3. Unlike other countries emerging from post-Cold War conflicts, there was no perceivedneed in Sierra Leone to construct a decentralized political framework specifically tofacilitate the peaceful co-existence of ethnic, religious or regional factions. Identitypolitics never featured prominently in the Sierra Leonean war and none of thewartime militias made much headway in peacetime politics. With GoSL support fordecentralization assured, the programme was launched as a purely technical exercise,managed by a World Bank’s Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project(IRCBP).A new Local Government Act (LGA) was ratified in 2004 and a fully functional system ofelected, service-orientated local councils was rapidly put in place. However, it was soonapparent that the GoSL and its international development partners had differing visions ofdecentralization:1. One the one hand, the GoSL had no intention of abolishing the chiefdoms and lookedto the past for its model of decentralization. In the 1950s, the colonial government setup elected District Councils to serve as planning authorities and managers ofoverseas development aid. The chiefdoms were left in place under this policy tocontinue their historic functions in maintaining law and order and were not affectedby the de-activation of these councils in 1972. After the war, GoSL policy makersstill tended to view decentralization as the restoration of this lost tier of localgovernment and, along with it, the historic division of functions between electedcouncils and chiefdoms.2. On the other hand, the chiefdoms had no place in donors’ vision of a modern, efficientand democratically accountable system of local government. Nor were donors willingto support a decentralization programme that was amenable to political capture bychiefs.The ensuing policy compromise saw the administrative, legal and fiscal ring-fencing of thenew local government system from other governmental agencies, especially the chiefdoms.This arrangement helped to ensure that best governance practice would prevail in the newsystem, but militated against overall administrative coherence.For example, the chiefdoms have retained their original tax raising and land managementfunctions under decentralization. In an effort get local councils and chiefdoms workingtogether effectively, the Local Government Act establishes local councils as the highestauthorities in their localities with the power to claim a precept on taxes collected by thechiefdoms. Paramount chiefs were given a limited number of ex officio seats on localcouncils. They were also given seats on Ward Development Committees (WDCs), whichwere designed to facilitate grassroots participation in development planning. However, thesearrangements have not prevented bitter disputes from arising between local councils andchiefdom authorities over revenue collection and planning authority.Part of the problem here is that the legacy of colonial attempts to build administrativecapacity in the chiefdoms remains intact on the statute. Chiefdom governance becamethoroughly de-formalized after Independence and chiefs are now only able to exerciseadministration through social networks. For example, the organization of local tax collectionrelies on the social embeddedness of lower ranking chiefs and their personal connections tothe paramount chief. From a bureaucratic point of view, the present system of local taxcollection is woefully inefficient. But from chiefs’ point of view it is emblematic of theirpersonal authority.Fanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 13