Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leonefigure quoted in the speech represented the council’s entire agriculture budget for that yearand the council leader concluded that the Resident Minister had either misunderstood thecouncil’s funding structure or was simply making mischief.The return of District Officers was viewed with consternation in both APC and SLPP-ledcouncils. SLPP councillors argued that reintroducing District Officers was a waste ofresources, which would be better spent on teachers’ salaries. APC councillors expressedconcerns that District Officers would “interfere in the development of the district” and arguedthat council chairman and mayors have an electoral mandate that should not be subordinatedto a central government appointee. An APC council leader also stated bluntly that reinstatingDistrict Officers could “kill decentralization”. The President, he believed, was receiving badadvice from people who were out of touch with post-war changes at the grassroots.Furthermore, if MPs wanted to get involved in local council business all they had to do wasresign their seats and stand in local elections.The local councils and chiefdoms remain competitors for local resources. It was reported inall councils that chiefdom authorities had taken the MLG’s intervention, first to suspend thecouncil precept on revenues collected by the chiefdoms and then to greatly reduce it, as apretext to stop handing over any revenues to local councils. 4 It was also reported in one urbancouncil that the local chiefdom Treasury Clerk was collecting rate demands from propertyowners and telling them that they didn’t have to pay. District councils have been exploringthe possibility of levying property rates in rural areas, but councillors reported that there isconsiderable public opposition to it. People tend to argue that no government has introducedrural rates before and so question their legitimacy. One councillor recalled ruefully that shehad broached the issue of property rates in her remote rural ward and was told that if shecontinued with that talk she would be “banished”. Again, the incoherencies of conserving twocompeting spheres of local authority are apparent.Even so, the research team encountered a more relaxed relationship between chiefs andcouncillors than was reported at the start of the decentralization programme (See Annex 1).Many councillors now appear resigned to the fact that they are never going to get significantrevenue from the chiefdom precept. As one council leader remarked, “there is no point inworrying about what you don’t have”. He went to state that he would happily waive theprecept on chiefdom revenues if his council was allowed to collect royalties on new miningdevelopments and biofuel plantations. It was reported in all councils that paramount chiefslobby regularly for a stake in construction contracts because these often make provision forlocal materials (e.g. sand, stones and timber) and unskilled labour inputs. The chiefs take themoney and then organize the labour and collections of materials as unpaid “communitycontributions”. Such arrangements may help to explain the more relaxed atmosphere.In the final analysis, the research team found no sign of any concerted strategy to roll backdecentralization and return to the modalities of “indirect rule. Even critics of the localcouncils acknowledged that decentralization is “a good idea” and that “nobody in their rightsenses would go back to the old system.” The Minister of Local Government shares this view.He emphasized in his interview that the GoSL wants rural communities to be viable andunderstands that “modern governance calls for strong local participation”. Decentralization,he went on, “has been given a fair trial”: the language of development is now used byeveryone and the people see local councils as legitimate agencies of government. Central4 This problem was also reported by DecSec intervieweesFanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 20