Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leonecustomary law (especially the Provinces Act, Cap 60). The one-party regime built by SiakaStevens acquired particular notoriety for abusing these powers (GoSL, 1999; Fanthorpe,2004a) and as Sierra Leone descended towards civil war, the conservation of unreformedchieftaincy structures looked more and more like a cynical strategy to insulate a corruptgovernment from popular accountability.These time-worn political strategies are making a comeback now that the threat and fear ofwar has receded. Even at the height of its enthusiasm for decentralization, the Kabbahgovernment also prioritized the restoration of the chieftaincy system. More than sixtyparamount chieftaincy elections were held within a year of the formal declaration of peace.Elite “sons of the soil” (e.g. MPs, senior civil servants, business leader and members ofnational party executives) were in attendance at many of these elections, often openlydeclaring their support for particular aspirants. Wrangling over government officials’revisions of Chiefdom Council lists, and decision-making in respect of rotational crowningagreements and aspirants’ eligibilities, was commonplace during these elections (Fanthorpeand Sesay, 2009).Attempts to re-establish centre-local networks were also apparent in the inaugural localgovernment elections of 2004. The prospect of managing substantial donor funds generatedintense competition for party nominations, often pitching locally resident elites against theirFreetown-based counterparts. The latter group tended to prevail in these struggles, but manyof the former stood as independents. Evidence of ballot stuffing during these elections waswidespread even in party strongholds (Brown, et al, 2006). The 2004 local governmentelections marked the revival in the electoral fortunes of the APC, which won many seats inFreetown and in its old strongholds in the north. The Kabbah government now faced agenuine contender for power. Reports began to reach international agencies ahead of the 2007national elections that the government was using chiefs to harass APC candidates andactivists in rural areas (Wyrod, 2008; Fanthorpe and Sesay, 2009). The party political contesthas remained intense since the APC victory in 2007. Ernest Bai Koroma’s official margin ofvictory in the Presidential election runoff was nine per cent, which was small enough toencourage both of the leading parties to campaign for victory in 2012.Concern is now growing among donors that the government is reviving the old strategy ofrecruiting chiefs as vote banks and party political enforcers and reining back its commitmentto decentralization (Robinson, 2010; Srivastava and Larizza, 2011). It is certainly possiblethat Sierra Leone’s governing elite has become confident that informal networks linkingFreetown to the provinces are back in place after the upheavals of war and that the urgency tore-establish the state’s territorial sovereignty through decentralization has correspondinglydiminished. The fact that the opposition SLPP is in firm control over local councils in itshistorical strongholds in the south may also have encouraged the revival of the old strategy ofruling the countryside through chiefs.A Provincial Secretary interviewed in 2009 was in no doubt that is strategy had returned. Inhis view, central governments will always support chiefs, even at the expense of the councils,“because a chief can deliver 40,000 votes.” The Koroma government’s announcement in June2010 that it was going to revive the post of District Officer also tends to support this analysis.A document setting out the rationale for reinstating District Officers was circulated at anintra-governmental seminar soon after the formal announcement. The document claims thatthe Provinces Act (Cap 60) represents a “comprehensive guide for the administration of theprovinces” and that “the authoritative stature that District Commissioners and DistrictFanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 61