Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leonecontracts with external agencies; c) ensure the proper collection of local revenues; d) approvethe appointment of chiefdom employees; e) draft bye-laws for consideration by the ChiefdomCouncil; f) advise the Chiefdom Council generally on local affairs and perform any otherduties delegated to it by the Chiefdom Council.The chiefdoms were never very effective in the service delivery role, not least because mostof their revenues were absorbed by paramount chiefs’ salaries (Kilson, 1966). In 1954, manyof the chiefdoms’ service responsibilities were taken over by the district councils(Zwanikken, et al, 1994) and were not returned when the latter were de-activated in 1972. Inany case, a study carried out in Kenema District the late 1960s found that ChiefdomCommittees were rarely meeting more than once a year (Barrows, 1971). By the 1970s,section chiefs had taken the place of ward representatives on most Chiefdom Committees andthe Chiefdom Council had devolved into an electoral college for paramount chieftaincyelections. Its non-chief members were usually appointed from above rather than elected bytaxpayers (Fanthorpe and Sesay, 2009). The decline of government-led economic investmentin the provinces during this period, and the assertion of central control over chiefdomfinancial administration (see note 1 above), only served to hasten the de-formalization ofchiefdom governance.Today, most lower-ranking chiefs remain socially embedded, presiding over the day-to-dayaffairs of their villages and neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, paramount chiefs have arrogated tothemselves the executive and administrative powers that, by law, are invested in theChiefdom Council and Committee. The resulting lack of accountability in chiefdomgovernance lies at the root of the numerous grievances that continue to be voiced in NGO-ledforums: e.g. exorbitant fines handed down in the local courts and chiefs’ informal courts, thetendency of paramount chiefs to broker deals with mining, logging and agri-businessenterprises without properly consulting local landowners or securing adequate communitycompensation and the tendency of chiefs and chiefdom staff to demand ad hoc fees forservices in addition to collecting formal taxes for these services (Fanthorpe, 2004b;Fanthorpe and Sesay, 2009; MCSL, 2009). Early predictions of the demise of chieftaincy inSierra Leone have proven to be premature, but the case for institutional reform at this level isstronger than ever.Clearly, the LGA should have gone much further to ensure that obsolete legislation wasrepealed and that local councils had genuine authority to carry out their mandates. None ofthe chiefdoms’ residual functions in respect of revenue collection, service management,planning, contracting and environmental regulation can reasonably be described as“traditional”. Accordingly, there is no reason in principle why all such functions could not betransferred to the local councils. Sierra Leone could have taken a lead here from otherAfrican countries and removed all executive powers from chiefs. Sierra Leone could havetaken a lead from other African countries and removed all executive powers from chiefs. Forexample, Section 246(f) of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) states explicitly that: “atraditional leader or cultural leader shall not have or exercise any administrative, legislativeor executive powers of government or local government.” In Ghana also, successivegovernments have taken measures to ensure that chieftaincy operates within the confines ofto civil society, however influential chiefs may remain in national politics (Boafo-Arthur,2001; Crook, 2005). However, Sierra Leone has instead conserved two competing spheres oflocal authority, each holding resources and capacities the other needs to govern effectively.Fanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 59