Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra LeoneThe old forms of politics are also visible in the palpable resentment, in some sections ofgovernment, towards local councils controlled by opposition parties. The issue here is thatopposition councils are seen to be using government funds to improve their own politicalstanding. However, it is noteworthy than APC and SLPP council leaders are united in theopposition to the reintroduction of District Officers. A change management culture could beevolving at this level and this is something donors could usefully monitor.Paradoxically, a final constraint on the effectiveness of councils in delivering services andenhancing the voice of poor people is endemic poverty. Rural people have become used overgenerations to surviving with little or no government assistance and that isolation has helpedto dampen demand for services. A culture of “self-help” remains strong. The positive side ofthis culture is seen in community support to unregistered schools and unverified teachers. Thenegative side is seen in chiefs’ exploitation of the willingness of communities to donatelabour and construction materials to projects. As long as political interests at the centre arevested in the conservation of the isolated communitarian poor, it is going to be difficult formodern civic culture to make inroads.F. How do local people and civil society groups perceive local council operations,particularly in comparison and contrast to existing chieftaincy structures?As noted above, many interviewees and FDG participants had a clear view of the localcouncils’ design purpose, i.e. to investigate local needs and do their best to satisfy them.Mention was also made of the fact the local councils are closely audited and monitored andtherefore operate with a high degree of fiscal and administrative probity. However, thequestionnaire survey also captured responses from people living remote areas that have seenlittle in the way of council services. These groups are not inclined towards a positive view ofthe councils. Furthermore, even when interviewees expressed approval of the servicesprovided by local councils, they tended to reserve strong criticism for councillors asindividuals. Common complaints were that councillors are rarely seen in their wards, thatthey call meetings with nothing to announce in the way of benefits for the people and thatthey lose interest in council work when they realize that they won’t become wealthy from it.In short, interviewees tended to assess local councils as development agencies andcouncillors as patrons.These conflicting assessments are reflected in the questionnaire outputs. On the one hand,Local councils scored highest among political authorities for actually deliveringdevelopment, representing the choice of more than 50% of respondents in Bo and BombaliDistricts. A lower score for local councils in Kono reflects the historic interest of centralgovernment in the local mining economy the local prominence of chiefs as political actors.The councils also received a lower score in WARD, which reflects the geographicalproximity of central government and the relatively high local density of self-organizedeconomic cooperatives and other interest-based associations.On the other hand, local councils received low scores on measures of public satisfaction andtrust. The Bombali data is remarkable in that 50.6% of respondents credited local councils forbringing the most development to their localities but only 18.9% identified the localcouncillor as the first political authority they would ask for development and services.Respondents in WARD and Kono also tended to favour development and service providersFanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 48