Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leonejust the moral responsibility of the individual councillor. Whatever the councils’ currentresource shortages, decentralization now makes it possible for local engagements betweencommunities, politicians and bureaucrats to be regulated constructively and thus to be ofbenefit to the poor. These possibilities were not present in the pre-war era.The Bo councils are currently expanding the horizons of local government in Sierra Leone.Both the city and district council have been extremely resourceful in obtaining externaltechnical assistance to develop their planning and service monitoring capacity. In essence,they are seeking to enhance their political authority and legitimacy in an extremelycompetitive political environment by adopting rationale-bureaucratic best practice. For them,the key challenge is to ensure that their planning maps and amenities databases arerecognized by other political and development agencies as authoritative. These initiatives donot generate a great deal of pro-poor decision making as yet, but they certainly have thepotential to do so. It would be in the interest of donors to support such capacity buildinginitiatives, especially given the lack of authoritative data on local services and amenities.The questionnaire results indicated high public confidence in both Bo councils, but there ismore at stake here than the SLPP heartland supporting councils led by its own party in aknee-jerk manner while the APC controls central government. SLPP councillors’determination to prove to the public that the party is still capable of governing effectively is alegitimate democratic ambition. It points again to the tentative emergence of a new andconstructive engagement between local government and citizenry in provincial Sierra Leone.C. To what degree have local councils used their power to deliver developmentoutcomes that would otherwise not have taken place?There is no definitive answer to this question for reasons already given in response toquestion A. As already noted, the system of fiscal transfers from central to local governmentguarantees a minimum level of services in all districts, which did not happen beforedecentralization. However, only a small proportion of this funding is discretionary.The only way to measure the unique impact of decentralization with any precision would beto: a) quantify the actual delivery of local council services and projects over a multi-yearcycle; b) trace the decision-making processes in local government that have (or have not)produced concrete development outcomes; c) compare these outcomes to the localdevelopment work of NGOs and other agencies.For example, it would useful to discover how many local development needs identified inWDC meetings are included in district development plans and how many of those areactually funded. If WDCs are found to be ineffective in generating development outcomes,other instruments (e.g. CBO “learning alliances”) could be tried instead.Furthermore, the fact that LGFD interlocutors described local council development plans as“wish lists” illustrates the need for further analysis of the funding responses to these plansand what they reveal about local councils’ de facto decision-making power. The researchteam did not inquire into decision-making processes in local government in depth, but theimpression given by MDA staff was that they tend not to consult with the councils when theyare not obliged to and that the process by which local councils release funds to MDAs ispurely bureaucratic. Hence some interlocutors’ complaints that Chief Administrators hold toomuch power. Again, further research into local government decision-making would allowstronger conclusions to be drawn on the relative success of de-concentration and democraticFanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 44