Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra LeoneParamount chiefs have begun to reach their own accommodations with local councils.Some paramount chief councillors are rarely seen in council, while others play anactive role in council business. However, some aspects of this accommodation are notconducive to good governance.E. What are the major constraints to making local councils a more powerful actor indelivering pro-poor development and enhancing poor people’s voice in local decisionmaking?The most pressing constraint is successive governments’ insistence on conserving theexecutive and administrative powers of chiefs. Without effective tax authority, thecouncils cannot develop a social contract, as elected service providers, with taxpayingvoters and service consumers. Furthermore, they are dependent on the cooperation ofchiefs to obtain land for projects, which compromises their planning authority.Lack of payroll devolution has hampered coordination between elected councillorsand technical staff, with some of the latter seeing the councils as little more thanfunding agencies.Endemic poverty has also constrained the effectiveness of local councils in deliveringservices and enhancing the voice of poor people. Rural people have become used overgenerations to surviving with little or no government assistance and that isolation hashelped to dampen demand for services. A local culture of “self-help” remains strong.F. How do local people and civil society groups perceive local council operations,particularly in comparison and contrast to existing chieftaincy structures?Many poor Sierra Leoneans have a clear view of the local councils’ design purpose.They are also aware that local councils are closely audited and monitored andtherefore operate with a high degree of fiscal and administrative probity. However,many remote communities have seen little in the way of council services and are nottherefore inclined towards a positive view of the councils.Even when interviewees expressed approval of the services provided by localcouncils, they tended to reserve strong criticism for councillors as individuals.Common complaints were that councillors are rarely seen in their wards, that they callmeetings with nothing to announce in the way of benefits and that they tend to loseinterest in council work when they find they can’t make any money from it. In short,the provincial populace tends to assess local councils as development agencies andcouncillors as patrons.Deference towards chiefs is greatest in remote agrarian communities but declinessharply in urban areas. The exception to this pattern is Kono District, whose historicdiamond industry and unique identity politics enabled chiefs to amass wealth andinfluence as political brokers. However, more than 50% of survey respondents inKono were in favour of transferring responsibility for revenue collection from chiefsto local councils. These results suggest that public deference towards Kono District’spowerful and wealthy chiefs is as much pragmatic as it is ideological.Fanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 5