Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

Decentralization in Sierra Leoneof aspirants in paramount chieftaincy elections. 13 Indeed, Provincial Secretaries monitorchieftaincy elections on the government’s behalf while actively engaged in the electoralprocess as presiding officers. Furthermore, it has always been central government thatdecides whether allegations of misconduct against a paramount chief warrant the setting up ofa commission of inquiry. No formal mechanism exists to hold a government to account fordeciding not to hold such an inquiry.The central executive’s continuing grip on chieftaincy affairs also lies at the root of currentdisputes between chiefs and local councils over revenue. In 2003, annual statements ofchiefdom revenue and expenditure were still being produced in the CCFCs’ offices in districtheadquarters and forwarded via the Provincial Secretaries to the Ministry of LocalGovernment. An examination of these statements found that they were devoid of anymeaningful content. On every statement, the heading for actual revenue/expenditure had beenamended with correcting fluid and a ball point pen to read “actual estimate” (Fanthorpe,2004b). Production of these budget statements ceased when chiefdom bank accounts wererestored under the decentralization programme. Withdrawals were now authorized by theParamount Chief, Treasury Clerk and local council Chief Administrator, with the CCFC’srole confined to training and supervising Treasury Clerks and compiling revenue statistics.Research commissioned by Concern Worldwide in Tonkolili District in 2009 found thatwhile Treasury Clerks were carrying out bank reconciliations, no budget statements werebeing produced. Tonkolili District Council staff claimed never to have seen any chiefdombudget statements, which rendered the oversight powers over chiefdom finances granted tothen under the LGA inoperable. The local CCFC (now under local council direction, but stilla central government employee) denied all knowledge of these statements. There wasconsiderable disquiet among chiefdom employees in the district at the time (especially LocalCourt staff and Chiefdom Police) over the lengthening arrears in their salary payments. Evensome Paramount Chiefs claimed not to know how the 60 per cent of local tax revenues and80 per cent of other revenues (e.g. market dues, shop licenses and ground rent on propertyleases) retained by the chiefdoms (after the local council had claimed its precept) was beingspent (Fanthorpe, 2009). Subsequent inquiries in DecSec revealed that no budget statementswere being produced for any chiefdoms and that the Ministry of Local Government was stillexercising close control over chiefdom finances.A Provincial Secretary interviewed in January 2009 confirmed this last point. He claimed thatsince the chiefdoms did not collect enough money to maintain an administration, the moneyis often used as an expense fund for central government “VIPs” on trips to the provinces. TheMinistry of Local Government had recently issued a directive stating that no local councilprecept should be collected for 2008. The explanation given was that resources needed to befound to pay the salary arrears of paramount chiefs and chiefdom staff. A subsequentdirective reduced the precept from 40 per cent of local tax to between 15 and 5 per cent,depending on the size of the chiefdom. Some commentators have argued that these directivesare illegal (e.g. Robinson, 2010). However, the Local Tax Act of 1975, yet another piece oflegislation neither revised nor repealed by the LGA, specifically empowers the Ministerresponsible for local government to issue directives in respect of local tax.13 Historically, the Sierra Leonean judiciary has been notoriously reluctant to return judgements incases involving chieftaincy and customary law, even when it has had the authority to do so.Fanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 57