Decentralization in Sierra Leone - Research for Development

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Decentralization in Sierra Leoneof aspirants in paramount chieftaincy elections. 13 Indeed, Provincial Secretaries monitorchieftaincy elections on the government’s behalf while actively engaged in the electoralprocess as presiding officers. Furthermore, it has always been central government thatdecides whether allegations of misconduct against a paramount chief warrant the setting up ofa commission of inquiry. No formal mechanism exists to hold a government to account fordeciding not to hold such an inquiry.The central executive’s continuing grip on chieftaincy affairs also lies at the root of currentdisputes between chiefs and local councils over revenue. In 2003, annual statements ofchiefdom revenue and expenditure were still being produced in the CCFCs’ offices in districtheadquarters and forwarded via the Provincial Secretaries to the Ministry of LocalGovernment. An examination of these statements found that they were devoid of anymeaningful content. On every statement, the heading for actual revenue/expenditure had beenamended with correcting fluid and a ball point pen to read “actual estimate” (Fanthorpe,2004b). Production of these budget statements ceased when chiefdom bank accounts wererestored under the decentralization programme. Withdrawals were now authorized by theParamount Chief, Treasury Clerk and local council Chief Administrator, with the CCFC’srole confined to training and supervising Treasury Clerks and compiling revenue statistics.Research commissioned by Concern Worldwide in Tonkolili District in 2009 found thatwhile Treasury Clerks were carrying out bank reconciliations, no budget statements werebeing produced. Tonkolili District Council staff claimed never to have seen any chiefdombudget statements, which rendered the oversight powers over chiefdom finances granted tothen under the LGA inoperable. The local CCFC (now under local council direction, but stilla central government employee) denied all knowledge of these statements. There wasconsiderable disquiet among chiefdom employees in the district at the time (especially LocalCourt staff and Chiefdom Police) over the lengthening arrears in their salary payments. Evensome Paramount Chiefs claimed not to know how the 60 per cent of local tax revenues and80 per cent of other revenues (e.g. market dues, shop licenses and ground rent on propertyleases) retained by the chiefdoms (after the local council had claimed its precept) was beingspent (Fanthorpe, 2009). Subsequent inquiries in DecSec revealed that no budget statementswere being produced for any chiefdoms and that the Ministry of Local Government was stillexercising close control over chiefdom finances.A Provincial Secretary interviewed in January 2009 confirmed this last point. He claimed thatsince the chiefdoms did not collect enough money to maintain an administration, the moneyis often used as an expense fund for central government “VIPs” on trips to the provinces. TheMinistry of Local Government had recently issued a directive stating that no local councilprecept should be collected for 2008. The explanation given was that resources needed to befound to pay the salary arrears of paramount chiefs and chiefdom staff. A subsequentdirective reduced the precept from 40 per cent of local tax to between 15 and 5 per cent,depending on the size of the chiefdom. Some commentators have argued that these directivesare illegal (e.g. Robinson, 2010). However, the Local Tax Act of 1975, yet another piece oflegislation neither revised nor repealed by the LGA, specifically empowers the Ministerresponsible for local government to issue directives in respect of local tax.13 Historically, the Sierra Leonean judiciary has been notoriously reluctant to return judgements incases involving chieftaincy and customary law, even when it has had the authority to do so.Fanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 57
Decentralization in Sierra LeoneData obtained from the CCFC in Magburaka showed that the gross amount of local taxcollected in Tonkolili District in 2008 was 315.2 million Leones, up from 146.2 million in2006 and 96.6 million in 2007. Even with the highest figure, the average amount of tax (notcounting revenues from market dues and store licences) raised in each of the elevenchiefdoms of the district that year was the equivalent of 6,500 US Dollars. A 40 per centprecept would have yielded the local council the equivalent of 28,600 US Dollars, which issmall in comparison to the average grant transfer to each local council of 680,000 US Dollarsin the same year. Yet the Ministry’s intervention, and the overall lack of transparency inchiefdom financial administration, undermines the development of any social contractbetween decentralized service provides and local taxpayers (Robinson, 2010). Developingsuch a contract is of course fundamental to decentralization as a peacebuilding strategy.Similar problems have emerged in respect of the chiefdom’s residual administrative andservice functions. Much of the existing legislation on chiefdom governance (including Cap61) was originally drafted in the colonial era with the aim of grafting local governmentfunctions onto customary authority (Fenton, 1935; Kilson, 1966). This legislation grantedChiefdom Councils (then known as Tribal Authorities) the power to raise their own taxes,draw up administrative budgets and hire salaried staff. In addition to their law and orderfunctions, chiefdom authorities also acquired statutory powers to issue orders to their peopleto prevent water pollution and the spread of infectious diseases, to ensure that the sick andmentally infirm were cared for and to regulate tree cutting, livestock management and farmburning. They were further empowered to make bye-laws pertaining to: a) the setting aside ofland in a chiefdom for development purposes, b) the management of public services and thelevying of fees for these services; c) the construction of new buildings; e) street trading; f) theestablishment, regulation and management of markets, slaughter houses, wash houses andcemeteries. By 1950, Chiefdom Councils were supporting (with considerable assistance fromcentral government) primary education, school scholarship schemes, agricultural extension,primary health and feeder road construction. Their staff at this time included clerks,messengers (forerunners of the Chiefdom Police) agricultural overseers, forest wardens,sanitary inspectors, dispensers, midwives and labourers (Davidson, 1953).Parallel efforts were made to ensure that chiefdom governing bodies were representative ofthe chiefdom people. The original statutory definition of a chiefdom authority was the“Paramount Chief, the Chiefs, the councillors and men of note elected by the peopleaccording to native law and custom, approved by the Governor and appointed a TribalAuthority under the Ordinance for the area concerned” (Tribal Authorities Ordinance, No. 8of 1937). Attempts were soon made to expand these bodies to include elected representativesof taxpayers. The 1:20 ratio of councillors to taxpayers was fixed by government decree in1956 (Kilson, 1966). Most Chiefdom Councils subsequently became too large to functioneffectively as deliberative forums, prompting statutory recognition of a Chiefdom Committeeto serve as the executive arm of the Chiefdom Council. The Tribal Authorities (Amendment)Act of 1964 states that the Chiefdom Committee should comprise of the Paramount Chief(Chairman), senior Speaker (Vice-Chairman), the second Speaker (if any), Treasury Clerk(Secretary) two members from each electoral ward in the chiefdom elected by the chiefdomcouncillors, and a literate councillor nominated by the local government Minister. ManyChiefdom Committees went on to appoint youth leaders and Women’s leaders (MammyQueens), although these last two positions have never been recognized in law.The primary functions of the Chiefdom Committee, according to the 1964 Act, are: a) toprepare chiefdom budgets and inspect chiefdom accounts on a regular basis; b) negotiateFanthorpe Consultancy Ltd Page 58
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