J. - National Labor Relations Board

VIII. JURISDICTIONThe Board's jurisdiction, as established in the Jones & Laughlin,and companion cases,' extends to the prevention and rectification ofunfair labor practices occurring in industries the interruption ofwhich by industrial strife would lead to interference with or diversionsof the free flow of interstate . or foreign commerce. During the pastfiscal year efforts were made to persuade the courts to engraft severalqualifications upon these principles.In the first place it was argued that, if the intrastate activities Ofan employer outweigh his interstate activities in volume or importance,his entire business is immune from regulation. The SupremeCourt's rejection of this contention -in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co.v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453 2 was reaffirmed in Consolidated EdisonCo. v. N. L. R. B. 305 U. S. 197, 221, and was followed by the FourthCircuit in N. L. R. B. v. A. S. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951, 954.It was further urged upon the courts that an employer's operationsmust be large enough to be of national importance in order to fallwithin the ambit of the Act. This view also was rejected by theSupreme Court. In N. L. I?. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 606-7, theCourt declared :The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extendsto all such commerce be it great or small * * *The language of the National Labor Relations Act seems to make it plain thatCongress has set no restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Board to be determinedor fixed exclusively by reference to the volume of interstate commerceInvolved. * * * We can perceive no basis for inferring any intention ofCongress to make the operation of the Act depend on any particular volume ofcommerce affected more than that to which courts would apply the maximde minThere are not a few industries in the United States which, though conductedby relatively small units, contribute in the aggregate a vast volume of interstatecommerce.This holding was subsequently relied on by the Eighth Circuit inholding that the Board had jurisdiction over a coal mine producingonly 267,495 tons annually, less than 85,000 tons of which were disposedof to instrumentalities of interstate commerce and to out-ofstatecustomers. N. L. R. B. v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 633(C. C. A. 8) , certiorari denied, October 9, 1939.Another limiting test rejected by the courts during the year relatedto the question of title to goods manufactured. In N. L. R. B. v.Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 608, it was contended that a local manufacturerwho merely processed goods owned by others was beyond thereach of Congressional power. The Supreme Court held :We cannot say, other things being equal, that the tendency [to obstruct shipmentsin interstate commerce] differs in kind, quantity or effect merely becausethe merchandise which the manufacturer ships, instead of being his own, is thatof the consignee or his customers in other states.1 N. L. R. B. v. Jones c Lau ghlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1; N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58; N. L. R. B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49.'See the Board's Third Annual Report, p. 217.112