Proper Names in the Light of Theoretical Onomastics

94 Vincent Blanármined identification // differentiation in particularities of a given class arenot studied in their language variability. These disciplines, of course, haveestablished their own methodology and terminology. The still un resolvedproblem of the meaning of proper names is being elucidated from a philosophicalviewpoint. Permanent attention is paid to the theory of referencewhich is one of the central terms of the philosophy of language and analyticalphilosophy; the act of bestowing a name (“ baptism”) is being investigatedwithin a causal network of the procedure of naming etc. In manyaspects, this research is inspiring and contributive but, on the whole, itcannot overlay the results achieved by current onomastics which focusesits research on the analysis of the formal aspect as well as the meaningof the onymic sign, onymic microsystems and their social functions. Letus give an example. Formal logic in respect of the manner of existenceof a referent (an onymic object) differentiates between real proper names,improper and empty proper names (for more detail on Russell’s and Wittgenstein’stheory of real (i. e. logical) proper names see Zouhar 2004, 212).Their definition of proper name does not conform to the linguistic definition.One of the theoretical questions by which the philosophy of languagehas significantly influenced research into proper names is the problem ofthe meaning of proper names. Perhaps the greatest roles were played byJ. S. Mill (mid-19 th century) and S. Kripke (2 nd half of the 20 th century).Mill stressed the notion that a proper name is a sign without meaning,a label which we link in our minds with the image of the object named.Proper names have no attributes which would define the object named.They have only denotation but not connotation. This interpretation is acceptedalso in logical semantics (compare e. g. Gahér 2006; Zouhar 2004);more recent contributions to onomastics by J. Dolník (1995, 1998) follow inthe tradition set by Mill. S. Kripke (1972) achieved relatively widespreadpopularity with his characterisation of proper names as rigid desig nators.Direct rigid reference exists in all possible worlds. Proper names in thesubject-predicative sentence can only play the role of a subject, they arenon-descriptive and they are rigid referents (compare also Zouhar 2004).When Kripke, following Mill (Zouhar 2004, 66 alike), says that the subjectdoes not have to have any specific properties in order to be associatedwith a name, it is valid only for the narrowly-defined propria usuallyused by philosophers of language and logicians. With regard to the referenceof expressions in various possible worlds, the manner of referencingand the character of referents of expressions, the following types of sin-