limit their competitiveness to meet new demand in the Reference case. In the near term, 5.5 GWof planned additions are put into place by 2020, offset by 3.2 GW of retirements over the sameperiod”, the report states. Recalling the 19 percent nuclear share in 2013, the EIA notes: “From2013 to 2040, the nuclear share of total generation declines in all cases, to 15 percent in the HighOil and Gas Resource case and to 18 percent in the High Oil Price case….” The EIA summarizes thetrend:Rising long-term natural gas prices, the high capital costs of new coal and nuclear generation capacity,state-level policies, and cost reductions for renewable generation in a market characterized by relativelyslow electricity demand growth favor increased use of renewables.In 2014, renewable sources (including conventional hydro) covered 9.8 percent of the primaryenergy consumption in the U.S., the highest share since the 1930s. Slightly more than half of thatrenewable energy was used to generate electricity, and the renewable share of electricity reached13 percent. 433China started construction of its first commercial reactor in 1985 and according to the IAEA, bythe middle of June 2015 had 27 reactors (23 GWe net) in operation (see Annex 7 for detailedoverview of the Chinese Reactor Program). In 2014, nuclear provided a record 130 TWh or 2.4percent of the country’s electricity, but still the lowest nuclear share of any country operatingmore than one commercial nuclear plant. During 2014, three new reactors were connected to thegrid, and so far in 2015 an additional four units have come on line. The nuclear industry has saidthat another two to four are likely to be approved for startup this year, which would make it thebiggest increase in China’s history. 434 Logically, China has the youngest reactor fleet in the worldwith an average age of 7.1 years (see Figure 28).While the 3 GW of new nuclear capacity in 2014 in China represented two‐thirds of the world'stotal, it is only a small fraction of the total electricity capacity added in China, with 47 GW fossilfueledpower plants, 21 GW of hydro, 23 GW of wind, and 11 GW of solar photovoltaics added tothe grid.Despite being the global leader in nuclear construction, with work underway on 24 reactors(23.7 GWe net) or nearly 40 percent of the global total, no new projects were approved in 2014.Only in February 2015 were units 5 and 6 at Hongyanhe given the green light; yet apparentlythese two units were already approved prior to the March 2011 Fukushima disaster. On7 May 2015, first concrete was poured for Fuqing‐5, which houses the first of the ChineseNational Nuclear Company’s (CNNC) Hualong design. Even so, this hiatus in orders highlights thechallenges to China’s nuclear power program. These include delays in construction and costincreases for the Westinghouse AP1000 reactors and AREVA EPRs, continuing doubts over thesiting of reactors in inland provinces, questions over which design or designs of reactors to433 U.S.EIA, “Today in Energy”, 28 May 2015, see http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21412,accessed 3 June 2015.434 South China Morning Post, “China to approve up to eight more nuclear reactors this year”, 22 April 2015,see http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies‐politics/article/1773417/china‐approve‐eight‐more‐nuclearreactors‐year,accessed 20 May 2015.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 113
develop, questions over safety and regulatory oversight, and questions about the commercialcontract between Westinghouse and the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC).Figure 28: Age of Chinese Reactor FleetSources: IAEA‐PRIS, MSC, June 2015Despite these uncertainties and problems, the State Council published in November 2014 theEnergy Development Strategy Action Plan 2014–2020, which proposed specific targets for theincrease of the share of non‐fossil fuels in the total primary energy mix from 9.8 percent in 2013to 15 percent in 2020. This includes an increase of nuclear capacity to 58 GW by 2020, with anadditional minimum of 30 GW under construction at the same time. 435 While the target isundoubtedly ambitious—and even industry strategists consider that “it now seems almost certainthat it cannot be reached”—it is in fact 12 GW below the target recommended by the State CouncilResearch Office (SCRO) in 2011 and a very significant reduction in the 130 GW forecast byofficials in 2010. However, even meeting this revised target will be difficult and will require thecompletion of all of the existing construction plus the ordering and completion of an addition 12GW by 2020. Concerns have been raised about the safety implications of such a rapid constructionprogram. The State Council’s plan also envisages an installed capacity of 350 GW of hydro, 200GW of wind, and 100 GW of solar photovoltaics by 2020. Many observers expect the wind andsolar targets to be exceeded.At the heart of the slowdown in nuclear development in China is the cancellation of projects andplans to build reactors inland, with all operating reactors currently found on the coast. It isreported that no inland plants will be started under the 12 th Five‐Year Plan, which finishes at theend of 2015, and discussions are underway about whether they will be included in the following13 th Plan now being formed. This is in marked contrast to 2007, when it was anticipated that ofthe more than 40 sites reserved for the development of nuclear power plants, 31 were inland. Intotal, 17 of the 29 mainland provinces have inland nuclear sites reserved. 436 While it would seemlikely that the industry may eventually move inland, it is far from clear where and at what speed.The most controversial issue, inside and outside the nuclear sector, appears to be potential sitingof reactors along the Changjiang River. With the rate of growth in electricity consumption slowingconsiderably—only 3.8 percent growth in 2014 compared to a 6.5–7.5 percent forecast—new435 NIW, “China—Inland Nuclear Developers Await Policy Change”, 2 January 2015.436 Ibidem.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 114
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use of passive features in the EPR
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intergovernmental agreement to comp
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Monticello 3/71 3/05 11/06Palisades
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2. Chinese Nuclear Power Plants Und
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2006-08, he carried out research at
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CGN or CGNPC - Chinese General Nucl
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INS - Indian Nuclear SocietyINSAC -
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NSSC - Nuclear Safety and Security
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Romania 2 1 300 14 18. 5% (‐) 8%
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Shandong Shidaowan 200 01/12/12 2/2
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USA 5 5 633Virgil C. Summer‐2 111
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25 Delayed numerous times. Latest I