Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey, UAE, and Vietnam to start building their first nuclear power plantsin 2012 and that Jordan and Saudi Arabia could follow in 2013. 62In all cases for these potential first‐time nuclear countries, even in the relatively rich Middle East,finance remains a criterion, if not the decisive one, in determining the choice of technology.However, what is striking is the extent to which in recent years the Russian industry hasexpanded its export policy through financial backing, with proposed projects in countries that arebuilding reactors for the first time, as well as new proposals with financing in countries likeFinland and Hungary that already have operating nuclear power plants. The current situation inUkraine raises questions over both the political support for such projects (especially in Europe)and—with the threat of widening economic sanctions against Russia—its ability to fund all of theprojects. The credibility of many of these projects is questioned also within the industry. LongtimeWorld Nuclear Association (WNA) strategist Steve Kidd considers it “reasonable to suggestthat it is highly unlikely that Russia will succeed in carrying out even half of the projects in whichit claims to be closely involved (…)”. 63Other increasingly active players in the export market are Japanese companies, such as Toshibaand Hitachi. The lack of new‐build opportunities domestically means that export markets havebecome essential to maintain their production capabilities, again with technology salesaccompanied by a financial package. Like Russia, this effort encompasses proposals in countriesthat currently don’t have programs (e.g. Lithuania and Turkey) as well as projects underdevelopment in more developed nuclear countries such as Bulgaria and the UK. The revisedJapanese New Growth Strategy includes an explicit statement that the Government will activelysupport the export of nuclear power. 64 In the future, China and South Korea might also providestate or quasi‐state financing for reactor export projects to support their domestic industries.Such concessionary state financing is seldom on offer for competing exports of renewable anddistributed generators or of energy efficiency.The following section provides a country‐by‐country overview of potential newcomer countries.In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), construction is ongoing at the Barakah nuclearproject, 300 km west of Abu Dhabi, where there are now three, soon to be four reactors, beingbuilt. At the time of the contract signing in December 2009, with Korean Electric Power Corp., theEmirates Nuclear Energy Corp (ENEC), said that “the contract for the construction, commissioning62 Lucas W Hixson, “IAEA – Vietnam and 4 other countries to incorporate nuclear energy after Fukushima”,Enformable.com, 24 February 2012, see http://enformable.com/2012/02/iaea‐vietnam‐and‐4‐othercountries‐to‐incorporate‐nuclear‐energy‐after‐fukushima/,accessed 5 May 2015.63 Steve Kidd, “The world nuclear industry – is it in terminal decline?”, NEI, 6 October 2014, seehttp://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionthe‐world‐nuclear‐industry‐is‐it‐in‐terminal‐decline‐4394815/,accessed 7 June 2015.64 Satoru Koyama, “The Role of Export Credits in NPP Financing”, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance(NEXI), September 2013, see http://www.oecdnea.org/ndd/workshops/wpne/presentations/docs/3_1_KOYAMA_2013_09_19_OECD_Seminer.pdf,accessed14 July 2014.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 43
and fuel loads for four units equalled approximately US$20 billion, with a high percentage of thecontract being offered under a fixed‐price arrangement”. 65The orginal financing plan for the project was thought to include US$10 billion from the Export‐Import Bank of Korea, US$2 billion from the Ex‐Im Bank of the U.S., US$6 billion from thegovernment of Abu Dhabi, and US$2 billion from commerical banks. 66 However, it is unclear whatother financing sources will be needed for the project, as it is reported that the cost of the projecthas risen significantly, with the total cost of the plant including infrastructure and finance nowexpected to be about US$32 billion, 67 with others putting the cost of the project at US$40 billion. 68In July 2010, a site‐preparation license and a limited construction license were granted for fourreactors at Barakah, 53 kilometers from Ruwais. 69 The application is based on the safety analysisprepared for South Korea’s Shin–Kori units 3 and 4, the “reference plant”, which is also still underconstruction. A tentative schedule published in late December 2010, and not publicly alteredsince, suggests that Barakah‐1 will start commercial operation in May 2017 with unit 2 operatingfrom 2018, unit 3 in 2019, and unit 4 in 2020. Construction of Barakah‐1 officially started on19 July 2012, of Barakah‐2 on 28 May 2013, and on Barakah‐3 on 24 September 2014.Construction of unit 4 is expected be launched in 2015. In March 2015, ENEC stated that Barakah‐1 is 69 percent complete and filed an application for the operating license for Barakah‐1 and ‐2.First fuel loading is expected in 2016. 70There is little independent information about the progress of construction. An InternationalAdvisory Board (IAB) for the UAE program, chaired by former IAEA Director General Hans Blix,said of construction in October 2013 that “unit 1 is progressing on schedule—overall progress ison target although construction is slightly behind”. 71 The IAB also noted that problems with thefalsification of parts that have been reported in the Korean nuclear sector have also been detectedat Barakah. While the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) stated that there was alow risk suspected parts had been installed, they also note that “the potential risks for the futureis not well understood at this stage” and the IAB responded that it would “appreciate further65 ENEC, “UAE Selects Korea Electric Power Corp, as Prime Team as Prime Contractor for Peaceful NuclearPower”, 27 December 2009, see http://www.enec.gov.ae/media‐centre/news/content/uae‐selects‐koreaelectric‐power‐corp.‐as‐prime‐team‐as‐prime‐contractor‐fo,accessed February 2015.66 Sang‐Baik Kim, Jan‐Horst Keppler, “Case Studies On Financing And Electricity Price Arrangements—TheBarakah Nuclear Power Plants, The United Arab Emirates”, Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation(OECD), Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), Nuclear Development Division, OECD NEA Workshop onElectricity Prices and Nuclear New Build, Paris, 19 September 2013, see http://www.oecdnea.org/ndd/workshops/wpne/presentations/docs/4_2_KIM_%20Barakah%20presentation.pdf,accessed25 June 2015.67 World Nuclear Association (WNA), “Country Profile—UAE”, see http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Country‐Profiles/Countries‐T‐Z/United‐Arab‐Emirates/,accessed February 2015.68 Business Korea, “Nuclear Power Korea Builds Nuclear Reactor in United Arab Emirates”, 20 May 2014, seehttp://www.businesskorea.co.kr/article/4728/nuclear‐power‐korea‐builds‐nuclear‐reactor‐united‐arabemirates#sthash.FVVVoXWp.xqt8U0nj.dpuf,accessed February 2015.69 ArabianBusinesss.com, “ENEC Welcomes Regulator’s License Approval”, 11 July 2010.70 ENEC, “ENEC Submits Operating License Application to FANR for Barakah Units 1 & 2”, 26 March 2015, seehttp://www.enec.gov.ae/media‐centre/news/content/enec‐submits‐operating‐license‐application‐to‐fanrfor‐barakah‐units‐1,accessed 7 June 2015.71 IAB, “Eighth Semi‐Annual report 2014”, UAE Nuclear Program, Undated, seehttp://www.uaeiab.ae/download.php?f=publications/IAB_Semi_Annual%20Report_English_2014.pdf,accessed 7 June 2015.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 44
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Figure 20: Wind, Solar and Nuclear,
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to rapidly accelerate the use of lo
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target is undoubtedly ambitious, bu
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Annex 1: Overview by Region and Cou
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U.S. that have “shown interest in
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The construction of Angra‐3 was s
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project boosted the nameplate capac
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Shuttering old, uneconomic reactors
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In the case of Vogtle, a report for
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limit their competitiveness to meet
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generation projects in oversupplied
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identified and solved will we allow
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commercial operation only on 31 Dec
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TEPCO that its staff had deliberate
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produce plutonium for use in MOX fu
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Power's Takahama‐3 and ‐4, with
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Kansai Electric, along with Kyushu
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permanent closure of five reactors
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contractor and China Nuclear Indust
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in May 2013, when the NSSC, followi
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The European Union 28 member states
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of the serious concerns by a range
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negative outlook, “owing to conti
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The average age of France’s power
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EDF shares lost up to 85 percent of
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power output is expected to rise si
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low 639 , and coal‐fired generati
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under construction. It was therefor
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utilize the fuel that it obtained b
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opinion at any of the sites propose
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criteria defined in the tender”.
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time of ordering, the reactors were
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intergovernmental agreement to comp
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IAEA have chosen to limit the LTS c
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2. Chinese Nuclear Power Plants Und
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2006-08, he carried out research at
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CGN or CGNPC - Chinese General Nucl
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INS - Indian Nuclear SocietyINSAC -
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NSSC - Nuclear Safety and Security
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UNSCEAR - United Nations Scientific
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