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eports on the faulty components’ issue”. 72 In the following, ninth semi‐annual IAB report, basedon meetings held in March 2014, it is stated that “to date there has not yet been a case of CFSI[Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items] concerning equipment of materials supplied orinstalled at the BNPP [Barakah Nuclear Power Plant]”. 73Construction started in November 2013 at Belarus’s first nuclear reactor at the Ostrovetspower plant, also called Belarusian‐1. Construction of a second 1200 MWe AES‐2006 reactorstarted in June 2014.In November 2011, the two governments agreed that Russia would lend up to US$10 billion for25 years to finance 90 percent of the contract between Atomstroyexport and the BelarusDirectorate for Nuclear Power Plant Construction. In February 2012, Russian state‐owned bankVneshekonom‐bank (VEB), and the Belarusian commercial bank Belvneshekonombank signed anagreement to implement the Russian export credit facility. In July 2012, the contract was signedfor the construction of the two reactors for an estimated cost of US$10 billion, including US$3billion for new infrastructure to accommodate the remoteness of Ostrovets in northern Belarus. 74The project assumes the supply of all fuel and repatriation of spent fuel for the life of the plant.The fuel is to be reprocessed and the separated wastes returned to Belarus. In August 2011, theMinistry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of Belarus stated that the first unitwould be commissioned in 2016 and the second one in 2018. 75 However, these dates were revisedand when construction was started it was stated that the reactors will not be completed until2018 and 2020. 76 In March 2015, Atomstroyexport admitted the plant would cost 1,433.7 billionRubles compared to the forecast from 2014 of 840 billion Rubles. At exchange rates of March2015, when the Ruble was valued at about half the level of 2014, this equates to an original costestimate of $US13 billion, increasing by 71 percent to US$22.9 billion.The project is the focus of international opposition and criticism, with formal complaints from theLithuanian government 77 and Belarus has been found to be in non‐compliance with some of itsobligations concerning the construction of the Ostrovets NPP (Nuclear Power Plants), accordingto the meeting of the Parties of the Espoo Convention. 78 The extent of international opposition tothe project was reported in Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (NIW), where it said that during theIAEA’s general conference, “a slick presentation from the major government players in the72 Ibidem.73 IAB, “Ninth Semi‐Annual report 2014”, International Advisory Board for the UAE nuclear program,undated, see http://www.uaeiab.ae/download.php?f=publications/IAB_Annual_%20Report_2014_EN.pdf,accessed 7 June 2015.74 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly (NIW), “Belarus, Aided by Russia and Broke, Europe’s Last DictatorshipProceeds With NPP”, 28 September 2012.75 V.V. Kulik, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of the Republic ofBelarus, Letter to the European Commission, dated 9 August 2011.76 WNN, “Ostrovets plant meets construction safety rules”, 7 November 2014.77 Bloomberg, “Lithuania Urges Belarus to Halt Nuclear Project on Safety Issues”, 20 August 2013, seehttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013‐08‐20/lithuania‐urges‐belarus‐to‐halt‐nuclear‐project‐on‐safetyissues.html,accessed 10 June 2014.78 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “Parties to UNECE treaties adopt declarationon applying environmental assessment procedures to nuclear energy issues”, Press Release, 13 June 2014.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 45