On 8 June 2015, the U.S. utility industry listened to Elon Musk, innovative entrepreneur, mainlyknown for the Tesla electric car, the photovoltaic power leasing leader SolarCity 20 and the recentPower Wall residential battery concept. Energy Wire reported the following exchange betweenelectricity utility executives 21 :“I don't buy the fact that this [traditional utility model] is a declining business,” said Tom Fanning, CEO ofSouthern, the largest investor-owned utility in the Southeast of the U.S.“Even though that's what the numbers say?” Christopher Crane, CEO of Exelon, the largest nuclearoperator in the U.S., interjected. (…)”“So then if distributed generation is eroding your growth, own distributed generation”, stated Fanning.The problem? Nuclear utilities have almost never invested into distributed generation. This islogical, as decentralization is the opposite to their business model that operates according to theold paradigm of centralized generation–transportation over substantial distances–distribution tofinal consumers. But if consumers start generating their own power—over two millionhouseholds in Australia, around 1.5 million in Germany—and countless families, businesses andpublic administrations elsewhere follow suit, what will the large traditional electricity utilities sellto whom?It is surprising to what extent the recovery strategies elaborated in France to save the nationalnuclear champions AREVA and EDF fall short of addressing the issues of the real world. There isno significant export market for AREVA's reactors and as this report shows, ongoing projects areconstantly delayed and most potential new markets don't meet the reality check. What is certainis that the projects in Finland and France have turned into a liability rather than an asset. WhileHinkley Point might be just another €1.5 billion loss. At the same time, EDF's client base isshrinking and electricity consumption is stagnating at best, while maintenance, backfitting andupgrading costs are increasing rapidly. Certainly a “negative outlook”. 22What is spectacular is the extent to which the nuclear industry is appearing to ignore reality. InMarch 2013, the late Luc Oursel, then AREVA's CEO, predicted that six reactors in Japan would beback online by the end of that year and that his company was counting on ten new reactor ordersby the end of 2016. 23 Two years later, no reactor is operating in Japan and 18 months from the20 Less known than the Tesla car, SolarCity has revolutionized investment schemes in decentralized solar systemsin the U.S. SolarCity custom‐designs, installs, finances and maintains photovoltaic systems on the basis of aguaranteed kWh sales price that is usually 10‐15 percent below the local utility rate. SolarCity claims to be“America's largest solar power provider” and to “provide one out of every four new solar electricity systemsnationwide”. See company website at http://www.solarcity.com/company/about, accessed 24 June 2015. Manyother companies have since copied the business model that has turned into the dominant implementation schemefor solar electricity in the U.S.21 EnergyWire, “Utilities—CEOs grapple with an elephant in the room – the future of electricity”, 22 June 2015, seehttp://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020624, accessed 24 June 2015.22 For a recent independent analysis of the French nuclear industry's record see Yves Marignac, ManonBesnard, “Nucléaire français: l'impasse industrielle”, 23 June 2015, seehttp://www.greenpeace.org/france/PageFiles/300718/20150623Rapport‐Nucl%C3%A9aireFrance‐ImpasseIndustrielle.pdf; a 5‐page English summary is athttp://www.greenpeace.org/france/Global/france/openspace/150630FrenchNuclearDeadlockReport‐ExecSummary.pdf; both accessed 3 July 2015.23 Les Echos, “Areva table sur la relance de six réacteurs au Japon en 2013”, 5 March 2013, seehttp://www.lesechos.fr/05/03/2013/LesEchos/21389‐080‐ECH_areva‐table‐sur‐la‐relance‐de‐sixreacteurs‐au‐japon‐en‐2013.htm,accessed 25 June 2015.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 21
deadline not a single new reactor order has materialized. In 2003, Westinghouse predicted a 36‐month construction schedule for its AP1000 reactor. 24 Twenty‐six months into the construction ofthe first two units to be built in the U.S., the estimated time to completion is an additional48 months, which would bring the total construction time to 74 months or more than twice theoriginal estimate. “Nuclear Could Replace Fossil Fuels in Less than a Decade”, said a headline oftrade agency NucNet in May 2015, quoting a study that had simply extrapolated the buildingratios during the peak construction periods in France and Sweden on a global scale. 25 Russia hasbeen particularly prolific with announcements of new nuclear projects. But even long‐time WorldNuclear Association strategist Steve Kidd considers it “reasonable to suggest that it is highlyunlikely that Russia will succeed in carrying out even half of the projects in which it claims to beclosely involved (…)”. 26 Indeed, the Russian builders aren't doing well neither. In February 2015,Moody's downgraded Atomenergoprom—100 percent subsidiary of Rosatom, as integratednuclear group also building reactors it is comparable to the French AREVA—to “junk” (Ba1) andassigned a “negative outlook”. 27 The lack of realism and overblown market expectations drivenuclear companies and traditional utilities into ruin.Some say that the nuclear industry has to address the size issue and develop models with reducedcapacity, so‐called Small and Medium‐size Reactors, also labeled Small Modular Reactors or SMRs.“SMRs could be a way forward for the European nuclear industry because they are easier tomanage, finance, get regulatory approval for, and even [win] public support”, a recent industryconference heard. 28 WNISR2015 provides an overview of history and status of SMRs and other“advanced reactor” designs. The concept of small reactors has been around for decades and anycommercial‐scale application still seems many years away and can therefore hardly be expectedto represent a game changer for nuclear power. Amory Lovins, Chief Scientist at the RockyMountain Institute, stated: “The basic challenge of the economies‐of‐mass‐production model isthat another kind of SMR, Small Modular Renewables (and efficiency), can scale down muchbetter and is already decades ahead in exploiting its own formidable economies of massproduction. Nuclear SMRs can never catch up.” 2924 Regis A. Matzie, “The AP1000 Reactor Nuclear Renaissance Option”, 26 September 2003.25 NucNet, “Nuclear Could Replace Fossil Fuels in Less than a Decade, Researchers Say”, 18 May 2015, seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all‐the‐news/2015/05/18/nuclear‐could‐replace‐fossil‐fuels‐in‐less‐than‐a‐decaderesearchers‐say,accessed 27 June 2015.26 Steve Kidd, “The world nuclear industry – is it in terminal decline?”, Nuclear Engineering International(NEI), 6 October 2014, see http://www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionthe‐world‐nuclear‐industry‐is‐itin‐terminal‐decline‐4394815/,accessed 7 June 2015.27 Moody's, “Rating Action: Moody's takes rating actions on six Russian utility and infrastructure GRIs; assignsnegative outlook”, 25 Feburary 2015, see https://www.moodys.com/research/‐‐PR319091, accessed4 June 2015.28 Nucnet, “SMRs Could Be The Way Forward For Europe, Conference Told”, 16 June 2015, seehttp://www.nucnet.org/all‐the‐news/2015/06/16/smrs‐could‐be‐the‐way‐forward‐for‐europe‐conferencetold,accessed 25 June 2015.29 Amory B. Lovins, personal communication, 15 June 2015.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 22
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national energy bureau around two w
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physical condition or suicide (“e
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Figure 20: Wind, Solar and Nuclear,
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to rapidly accelerate the use of lo
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target is undoubtedly ambitious, bu
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Annex 1: Overview by Region and Cou
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U.S. that have “shown interest in
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The construction of Angra‐3 was s
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project boosted the nameplate capac
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Shuttering old, uneconomic reactors
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In the case of Vogtle, a report for
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limit their competitiveness to meet
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generation projects in oversupplied
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identified and solved will we allow
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commercial operation only on 31 Dec
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TEPCO that its staff had deliberate
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produce plutonium for use in MOX fu
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Power's Takahama‐3 and ‐4, with
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Kansai Electric, along with Kyushu
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permanent closure of five reactors
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contractor and China Nuclear Indust
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of the serious concerns by a range
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negative outlook, “owing to conti
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The average age of France’s power
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EDF shares lost up to 85 percent of
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power output is expected to rise si
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low 639 , and coal‐fired generati
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under construction. It was therefor
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utilize the fuel that it obtained b
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opinion at any of the sites propose
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criteria defined in the tender”.
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signed a binding agreement that mad
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let the reactor operate until 2026.
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time of ordering, the reactors were
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intergovernmental agreement to comp
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Takahama‐1 (PWR) 826 1974 - 40 10
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IAEA have chosen to limit the LTS c
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Note: SFP: Spent Fuel Pool, RPV: Re
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Table 10: Definition of Credit Rati
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Monticello 3/71 3/05 11/06Palisades
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(as of 10 June 2015) 764Table 12: C
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2. Chinese Nuclear Power Plants Und
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2006-08, he carried out research at
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CGN or CGNPC - Chinese General Nucl
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INS - Indian Nuclear SocietyINSAC -
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NSSC - Nuclear Safety and Security
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UNSCEAR - United Nations Scientific
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Romania 2 1 300 14 18. 5% (‐) 8%
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Shandong Shidaowan 200 01/12/12 2/2
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USA 5 5 633Virgil C. Summer‐2 111
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25 Delayed numerous times. Latest I