criteria defined in the tender”. 703 However, it transpired that the tender was irrelevant, as a keyissue for new‐build is the level of state support, and in February 2014, then Prime MinisterBohuslav Sobotka stated: “The new government is not willing to provide guarantees forpurchasing prices of electricity that could be a big financial burden for households and firms inthe next decades.” 704 CEZ Chief Executive Daniel Benes subsequently said: “If there is no certaintyand a guarantee in legislation, it is impossible to decide about the construction at Temelín underthe current market conditions.” 705 Then in April 2014, CEZ simply cancelled its call for tenders forthe two new units at Temelín, citing the low electricity market price and the lack of governmentguarantees.Despite this, the Czech Industry and Finance ministries continue to promote nuclear power, butthere is little incentive or rationale for pushing for new construction in the short term. Rather, itis suggested that new capacity will be build some time in the next 20 years. 706 Czech news agencyČeské Noviny said an investment of between CZK250 billion (US$10.4 billion) and CZK300 billion(US$12.4 billion) would be needed before the state could consider whether or not to provideguarantees for new nuclear power projects. 707 In these plans, new capacity is foreseen for bothlocations, Dukovany and Temelín, to maintain employment after the closure of existing reactors.Hungary has only one nuclear power plant, at Paks, where four VVER 440‐213 reactors thatprovided 14.8 TWh or 53.6 percent of the country’s electricity in 2014. The reactors startedoperation in the early 1980s and have been the subject of engineering works to enable theiroperation for up to 50 years, until the 2030s, accompanied by a 20 percent increase in capacity.The first unit received permission to operate for another 10 years after a periodic safety review in2013, the second unit in 2014. 708In March 2009, the Parliament approved a government decision‐in‐principle to build additionalreactors at Paks. 709 Even at this time, Russian assistance seemed to be the preferred option, andthe Foreign Minister indicated that expansion of the Paks plant would be part of a “package deal”on outstanding economic issues with Russia. 710 But it was still a shock to nuclear vendors 711 whenin January 2014, unexpectedly abandoning the previously promised international tender process,an agreement was reached between Hungary and Russia through direct negotiation between theirheads of government. This was followed by an engineering, procurement, and construction703 CEZ, “Areva Failed to Comply with Public Contract Requirements Defined for Building Temelin NPP Units3 and 4: CEZ had to Disqualify this Bidder”, 5 November 2014, see http://www.cez.cz/en/investors/insideinformation/1499.html,accessed 13 June 2014.704 Ceskenoviny, “Government won’t guarantee electricity prices for Temelin—PM Sobotka”, 6 February 2014.705 Reuters, “Czech CEZ boss says prefers dividend predictability”, 31 March 2014.706 NIW, “Prague’s Vague NewBuild Plans”, 23 February 2015.707 WNN, “CEZ should fund new reactor projects, says government report”, 20 January 2015, seehttp://www.world‐nuclear‐news.org/NP‐CEZ‐should‐fund‐new‐reactor‐projects‐says‐government‐report‐20011501.html, accessed 18 May 2015.708 WNN, “Paks unit 2 gets 20‐year life extension”, 27 November 2015, see http://www.world‐nuclearnews.org/RS‐Paks‐unit‐2‐gets‐20‐year‐life‐extension‐27111401.html,accessed 18 May 2015.709 John Shepherd, “Hungary’s Parliament Paves Way to Build New Reactor Unit”, NucNet, 31 March 2009.710 Realdeal.hu, “Hungary, Russia Seek to Resolve All Outstanding Issues in One Package, Says FM”,21 January 2011.711 NIW, “Newbuild: Hungary Ditches Tender in Favor of Rosatom Deal”, 17 January 2014.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 161
contract in December 2014 worth €12.5 billion (US$13.2 billion). It is said that this will be a“turn‐key” contract, including a 20‐year fuel contract and spent fuel return. 712The loan deal has been criticized 713 because it was agreed just five days before a general election,and only a few of the crucial terms and conditions of the deal have been made public. 714 Accordingto a version of the loan contract leaked by the Russian side, the loan rate will be significantlybelow the market norm for such a project, with reports suggesting variable rates of 3.95‐4.95percent interest to cover 80 percent of the project’s costs. However, penalty conditions are said tohave the possibility to bankrupt the Hungarian State, and opposition parliamentarians have calledfor the Government to cancel the project. The Government is nonetheless determined to proceedand has even modified proposed legislation to increase the period for which contract terms wouldremain secret from 15 years to 30. The scope of the confidentiality is that it “may deny publishingany data connected to the project, if their publication would engage either the national securityinterests of Hungary, or intellectual property rights.” 715 The secrecy of the project has raisedsignificant national and international protest as by keeping everything confidential, there will belittle opportunity to keep track of costs. The project represents a U‐turn for the ruling party,which had fiercely criticized previous socialist governments for failing to diversify away fromreliance on Russian energy. Russia already provides about three‐quarters of the country’s oil andgas supplies. 716 However, the nuclear fuel supply contract was rejected initially by the EuratomSupply Agency and subsequently by the European Commission, as it would “not comply with theEuropean policy on diversification”. 717 It is still unclear how far the fuel contract can or will be renegotiatedand whether the European Commission will further investigate the implications of thefinancial model for State Aid violations.Romania has one nuclear power plant at Cernovoda, where two Canadian‐designed CANDUreactors began operating in 1996 and 2007. In 2014, they provided 10.7 TWh or 18.5 percent ofthe country’s electricity and achieved the second highest annual load factor in the world with95.2 percent (partly because CANDU reactors refuel whilst online). Construction started in the1980s, with the initial intention of five units. The first two units were partly funded by theCanadian Export Development Corporation, the second also partly by Euratom. Over the pastdecade, numerous foreign firms have been linked to the completion of additional Cernavoda units,including AECL and SNC‐Lavalle (Canada), Ansaldo (Italy), AtomTechnoProm (Russia), CEZ(Czech Republic), Electrabel (Belgium), ENEL (Italy), GDF Suez (France), Iberdrola (Spain), KHNP(South Korea), RWE (Germany), and Arcelor Mittal (France). 718 In December 2013, Arcelor Mittaland ENEL, as the last foreign partners, sold back their shares in the project to the Romanian state.The latest attempt involves China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), which signed a letter ofintent in November 2013 with the Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica (SNN) to complete theprojects in 2019 and 2020. In March 2014, it was announced that an extension would be grantedto the letter of intent, which was set to expire on 25 May 2014. 719 In October 2014, SNN and CGN712 NIW, “Newbuild, EPC Contract Signed for Russian VVER1200s at Paks”, 12 December 2014.713 NIW, “Hungary: Secrecy, Political Risk Cloud Prospects for Paks Expansion”, 20 February 2015.714 Politics.hu, “Hungary signs EUR 10 billion Paks agreement with Russia”, 1 April 2014.715 NIW, “EU Hungary doubles down on Paks 2 secrecy”, 27 February 2015.716 Financial Times, “Russia builds clout in eastern Europe with €10bn loan to Hungary”, 14 January 2014.717 NIW, “Hungary Questioning the Paks 2 Fuel Contract”, 13 March 2015.718 WNA, “Nuclear Power in Romania”, Updated December 2013.719 Telgraf, “Construction of NPP units 3 and 4, the petty cash”, 22 March 2014.Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt et al. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2015 162
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