Product Liability 2009 - Arnold & Porter LLP
Product Liability 2009 - Arnold & Porter LLP
Product Liability 2009 - Arnold & Porter LLP
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<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (UK) <strong>LLP</strong> Recent Developments in European <strong>Product</strong> <strong>Liability</strong><br />
the Commission acknowledged in its Third Report, many of the<br />
disparities in the application of the Directive reflect the varying legal<br />
traditions and procedural rules in different Member States. In<br />
November 2008 the European Commission published a Green Paper<br />
on Consumer Collective Redress (COM (2008) 794 final) which<br />
sought views on how existing methods of redress in respect of<br />
breaches of consumer law could be improved. The Green Paper was<br />
developed in the light of a series of studies which have reviewed the<br />
effectiveness and efficiency of existing EU collective redress<br />
mechanisms, the availability of alternative means of consumer redress<br />
(other than court proceedings), and have looked specifically at the<br />
problems faced by consumers in obtaining collective redress for<br />
infringements of consumer protection legislation.<br />
These reports found that only 13 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria,<br />
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,<br />
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) have collective redress schemes,<br />
and that there was considerable divergence in the way those schemes<br />
operated and were regulated. Existing collective redress mechanisms<br />
had been applied in relatively few cases and the levels of<br />
compensation provided to consumers was low. The reports concluded<br />
that the efficiency and effectiveness of existing mechanisms could be<br />
improved, that they may not provide adequate redress where a group<br />
of consumers pursue very low value claims, and the absence of any<br />
collective redress mechanism in some countries may leave consumers<br />
with no adequate means of obtaining compensation. In the light of<br />
these studies the Commission’s Green Paper concludes that because of<br />
weaknesses in the current EU framework “a significant proportion of<br />
consumers who have suffered damage do not obtain redress”. It<br />
sought views on 4 possible options (which could be combined or<br />
pursued independently) to address this problem:<br />
1 No action - taking no immediate action while monitoring the<br />
impact of the national and EU systems that are already in<br />
place or are about to be implemented (such as the Mediation<br />
Directive, which must be implemented by 2011, and the<br />
Small Claims Regulation which came into force at the<br />
beginning of <strong>2009</strong> and applies to cross-border disputes with<br />
a value of €2,000 or less).<br />
2 Co-operation between Member States - this would involve<br />
setting up a co-operation scheme which would extend the<br />
protection of existing national collective redress systems to<br />
consumers from other Member States, and recommend that<br />
countries which do not have such a scheme should establish<br />
one. The Green Paper concludes that there would, therefore,<br />
need to be a cost sharing mechanism as Member States may<br />
be reluctant to finance a mechanism for proceedings by noncitizens<br />
in circumstances where no equivalent mechanism<br />
exists in the citizen’s own country. Issues relating to<br />
jurisdiction and choice of law would also arise.<br />
3 Mix of policy instruments - this option could include a<br />
mixture of binding and non-binding measures such as:<br />
promoting collective mediation or arbitration; raising<br />
consumers’ awareness of existing measures; extending<br />
existing small claims procedures to allow mass small claims<br />
to be brought; extending the Consumer Protection<br />
Cooperation Regulation, for example to include a power to<br />
compensate consumers that have been harmed where there<br />
has been an intra-Community infringement, or by providing<br />
a power to skim-off the profit made by traders who have<br />
committed such an infringement; or improving consumer<br />
complaint handling systems.<br />
4 Judicial collective redress procedure - introducing a binding<br />
or non-binding EU measure that would ensure that a judicial<br />
collective redress procedure exists in all Member States. The<br />
Green Paper makes clear that the aim of such a mechanism<br />
would be to “facilitate meritorious claims and benefit<br />
consumers”, while discouraging a “litigation industry”. In<br />
its “Questions and Answers” document which accompanies<br />
ICLG TO: PRODUCT LIABILITY <strong>2009</strong><br />
© Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London<br />
the Green Paper the Commission makes clear that the<br />
introduction of a “US style class action” is not what is<br />
envisaged. It identifies a “toxic cocktail” of measures which<br />
in combination should not be introduced including<br />
contingency fees, punitive damages, extensive pre-trial<br />
discovery and opt-out redress mechanisms.<br />
The Green Paper highlights a number of issues that would need to<br />
be considered if this option were to be pursued, including how the<br />
procedure would be financed, how unmeritorious claims could be<br />
prevented and whether the procedure should be ‘opt-in’ (consumers<br />
must commence an action) or ‘opt-out’ (consumers are treated as<br />
parties to a court action unless they specifically opt-out). Although<br />
the Green Paper does not say expressly that such a measure would<br />
harmonise the current systems in all Member States, the “Questions<br />
and Answers” states that such a procedure would introduce “one EU<br />
wide system for the Single Market”.<br />
The Green Paper’s consultation period has now expired, and the<br />
Commission is considering the responses received. The Green<br />
Paper acknowledges that “there is no easy answer to the problem”<br />
of providing EU consumers with adequate redress and concludes<br />
that all current redress systems have strengths and weaknesses, and<br />
that no single mechanism is ideal for all types of claims. In view of<br />
the difficulties inherent in pursuing each of the proposed options it<br />
is unclear what, if any, measures will ultimately be introduced.<br />
Collective Redress Benchmarks<br />
The Commission has also consulted on a set of 10 benchmarks<br />
which are intended to set the standard for collective redress systems<br />
throughout the EU. Once the benchmarks have been finalised, the<br />
Commission intends to evaluate whether EU Member States are<br />
meeting the benchmarks and, if not, it will consider “what EU<br />
action would best meet the needs of European consumers”. The<br />
benchmarks may, therefore, provide the platform for possible<br />
reform in this area. They are:<br />
“1. The mechanism should enable consumers to obtain<br />
satisfactory redress in cases which they could not otherwise<br />
adequately pursue on an individual basis.<br />
2. It should be possible to finance the actions in a way that<br />
allows either the consumers themselves to proceed with a<br />
collective action, or to be effectively represented by a third<br />
party. Plaintiffs’ costs for bringing an action should not be<br />
disproportionate to the amount in dispute.<br />
3. The costs of proceedings for defendants should not be<br />
disproportionate to the amount in dispute. On the one hand,<br />
this would ensure that defendants will not be unreasonably<br />
burdened. On the other hand, defendants should not for<br />
instance artificially and unreasonably increase their legal<br />
costs. Consumers would therefore not be deterred from<br />
bringing an action in Member States which apply the “loserpays”<br />
principle.<br />
4. The compensation to be provided by traders/service<br />
providers against whom actions have been successfully<br />
brought should be at least equal to the harm caused by the<br />
incriminated conduct, but should not be excessive as for<br />
instance to amount to punitive damages.<br />
5. One outcome should be the reduction of future harm to all<br />
consumers. Therefore a preventative effect for potential<br />
future wrongful conduct by traders or service providers<br />
concerned is desirable - for instance by skimming off the<br />
profit gained from the incriminated conduct.<br />
6. The introduction of unmeritorious claims should be<br />
discouraged.<br />
7. Sufficient opportunity for adequate out-of-court settlement<br />
should be foreseen.<br />
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