"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War
NKIDP Working Paper #3
militaristic.
Evacuation of the population, administrative institutions, industries, and
factories of Pyongyang began.
At the same time, the leadership of the DPRK took one more step that alarmed us.
On 31 January 1968, Kim Il Sung addressed an official letter to Comrade Kosygin, the head
of the USSR Council of Ministers. This letter said that “Johnson’s clique could at any time
engage in a military adventure in [North] Korea,” that the policy of the American
imperialists “is a rude challenge to the DPRK and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
who are bound together by allied relations according to the treaty of friendship, co‐
operation and mutual assistance; [it is] a serious threat to the security of all socialist
countries and to peace in the entire world”.
This message further officially informed the Soviet government on behalf of the
government of the DPRK that they were “forced to conduct preparations to give the
aggression an appropriate rebuff” and the letter expressed confidence that “in case of the
creation of a state of war in [North] Korea as a result of a military attack by the American
imperialists, the Soviet government and the fraternal Soviet people will fight together with
us against the aggressors…”
Kim Il Sung’s letter ended with a proposal: in case such a situation materialized,
“ [you should] provide us, without delay, military and other aid and support, to mobilize all
means available.”
M atters took a serious turn.
An official communication along government lines, bypassing comradely
consultations along party lines, which are usual in such cases, spoke to the intention of the
North Korean leadership to bind the Soviet Union somehow, using the existence of the
treaty between the USSR and the DPRK as a pretext to involve us in supporting such plans
of the North Korean friends about which we knew nothing. The CC Politburo believed that
the time had come to state our attitude clearly to the North Korean comrades regarding
these questions and certain peculiarities of their policies that concern our country.
Without giving an official reply to Kim Il Sung’s message, we addressed a
communication to him, asking him to come to Moscow for a comprehensive exchange of
opinions regarding this situation which has emerged. Comrade Kim Il Sung replied that, at
the present time, circumstances did not permit him to leave the country. Member of the
KWP CC Politburo, Deputy Premier and Minister of Defense Kim Jangbong was instead
dispatched to Moscow for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet army.
On the Politburo’s instructions, I received Kim Jangbong on 26 February 1968 and
had a lo ng discussion with him, in the course of which I expressed in all earnestness our
position on a series of important questions.
He was told that we still do not depart from the assumption that the Korean
comrades maintain a course for the peaceful unification of Korea, for we are not aware of
any changes to this course. In any case, under the current circumstances, we are against
taking the matter towards unleashing a war, though we fully understand the desire of the
DPRK to strengthen its own defense, and we actively support this. We do not understand
the meaning of the information that reached us regarding the evacuation of Pyongyang. We
have no information from our North Korean friends regarding their talks with the
Americans and the aims of these talks.
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