"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War NKIDP Working Paper #3 work in Korea. 11 Some have argued that Kim was trying to help his Vietnamese allies by forcing the American military to divide its resources between the two fronts. 12 Others have claimed that Kim believed that America's commitment in Southeast Asia would prevent the U.S. from responding forcefully to his provocations against the South. 13 Still another school of thought suggests that Kim was trying to warn the United States that attempts to replicate the Vietnam War through attacks in Korea would be met by harsh resistance. 14 Recent documents from the communist side do suggest that Kim was paying close attention to events in Vietnam, and that there may be a kernel of truth to all of these suppositions. Still, a detailed examination suggests that other factors were likely more important. Kim was certainly aware of the American escalation of the War, and was greatly troubled by it. But there seems to be little concrete evidence connecting the two escalations. A coincidence in timing does not necessarily indicate causation. A third category is even broader, as it connects the DPRK escalation to changing circumstances within superpower Cold War relations. There is again a wide range of specific arguments made within this framework. Cho Soon Sung has argued that Kim felt that the growing US-USSR rapprochement, by removing the threat of Soviet reprisal, had encouraged the US to increase its attacks against the smaller communist nations; North Korea, in this argument, had little to lose by increasing its activities against the South since the U.S. was likely planning 11 See, for example Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (University of California Press, 1972), p. 594-6 . 12 See, for example, Frank Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 4, summer 1972, p. 54-74; and Vandon Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," Military Review, Volume 68, number 5, May 1988, p. 32-43. 13 See, for example, Donald Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," in Asian Survey, Volume 15, December 1975, p. 1018; Narushige Michishita, "Calculated Adventurism," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 16. Number 2, Fall, 2004, p. 187; Daniel Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War, chapter 1, on-line at: http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/Bolger/bolger.asp (last accessed December 14, 2009). 14 Yongho Kim, "North Korea’s Use of Terror and Coercive Diplomacy: Looking for their Circumstantial Variants," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 8-9 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 6
Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper #3 December 2010 increased actions against them regardless. 15 Bradley Martin has offered a similar interpretation, one that adds the declining DPRK-China relationship to the equation by suggesting that Kim also felt abandoned by the Chinese, because of their focus on the Cultural Revolution. 16 Bernd Schaefer has also stressed the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, arguing that the chaos in China convinced Kim that he might emerge as the dominant Asian communist leader, but only if he could first demonstrate to other Communist states his commitment to fighting Western imperialism. 17 Kathryn Weathersby has taken a different Cold War slant, suggesting that Kim was emboldened by his success in the preceding decade in maintaining his independent policy line despite the concerns of the Communist superpowers, largely by playing them off against each other. Accordingly, she speculates, Kim was encouraged to believe that he could increase his efforts against the South without serious ramifications. 18 Regardless of the specific interpretation, however, this school is generally united by the belief that changing external circumstances, largely rooted in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, were central in determining the DPRK policies. A fourth category finds the defining imperative to be much closer to home by placing South Korean developments at the forefront of the escalation. In this interpretation, Kim recognized the growing economic might and political stability in South Korea, rooted particularly in the consolidation of power of the Park Chung Hee government, the massive economic and material support coming from the United States, the 1965 normalization of ROK- 15 Soon Sung Cho, "North and South Korea," in Asian Survey, Volume 9, January 1969, p. 35-6. 16 Bradley Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (Thomas Dunne, 2004), p. 121-24. Chapter 7 of Martin's book, it should be noted, speculates that specific DPRK actions such as the Pueblo seizure and the Blue House raid may have reflected external factors such as the Vietnam War as well. Still, he is clear that the longer process of increased belligerency that started earlier in the decade was rooted in his relations with th e Communist superpowers. 17 Schaefer, "North Korean 'Adventurism' and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972." 18 Kathryn Weathersby, "Dependence and Mistrust," US-Korea Institute Working Paper Series, WP 08-08, December 2008. www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 7
Page 1 and 2: NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTA
Page 3 and 4: THE NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUM
Page 5 and 6: "Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim
Page 7 and 8: Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper
Page 9: Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper
Page 49 and 50: www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 45 Mitch
Page 53 and 54: DOCUMENT APPENDIX DOCUMENT No. 1 *
Page 57 and 58: Letter from GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Page 61 and 62:
Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper
Page 63 and 64:
www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp Mitchell
Page 65 and 66:
Letter from GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 69 Mitch
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
DOCUMENT No. 10 * * * Mitchell Lern
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
On the Development of the Economy M
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103:
show all

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?