"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War NKIDP Working Paper #3 DPRK], they would have released the crew of the Pueblo long ago, in the same way as they had always done in comparable previous cases (e.g., South Korean fishing boats, American helicopters). But at present, facing the American threats, they cannot take such measures for the time being. The Soviets, on their part, are of the opinion that by now the DPRK and the socialist countries have already achieved practically everything that could have been achieved at the expense of the USA, in the revealing of the aggressive foreign policy of the USA, etc., in the wake of the incident. The further prolongation of the crisis would be seriously dangerous, however, and therefore the Soviet side strives to induce the DPRK to find a right time for the handing over of the Pueblo and its crew (in the view of the Koreans, primarily the crew) so as to put an end to the crisis. With regard to that, our [Soviet] comrades say the following: It seems obvious that the Johnson administration really strove, and still strives, for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. This is indicated by the contacts established between American official personages and socialist diplomats in Moscow, New York, and elsewhere, and also by the actions of the Americans, for one can hardly accept the explanation that it was only due to technical reasons that the Americans „allowed” the DPRK to capture the Pueblo. Evidently the Americans are seriously afraid of that if they took military steps, this would carry incalculable consequences. The Soviets, on their part, repeatedly emphasized that now a new Korean War, let alone a greater possibility of some Soviet‐American military confrontation, would hardly serve American interests. However, the question is whether a possible prolongation of the crisis will bring forth circumstances which may induce the Johnson administration to head towards a military solution against its wishes. For instance, the question is how much [36th President of the U.S.] Johnson will be able – and willing – to resist the extremely provocative attitude of the Congress that demands immediate military actions against the DPRK, in the light of, for example, the considerations of the election struggle… On the other hand, the Johnson administration already made use of the Korean crisis to draft reservists, that is, to take a step it had not dared take for long years because of the [prospective] reaction of public opinion. In this sense one can hardly preclude that the Korean crisis reinforces the [position of the] hawks with regard to the further shaping of the American policies related to the Vietnam War. Therefore the Soviet side considers that the next task is to strive to induce the Korean comrades to seek, and find, a „moment” that will be convenient for the solution of the crisis. As we mentioned before, the opinion they form of the Korean standpoint is that it will be possible to influence our Korean comrades in such a way. Another aspect of the question is that the Afro‐Asian member states of the SC [the UN Security Council] extremely strongly press for a peaceful solution. Thus in case of the further prolongation of the affair the DPRK and – partly – the socialist countries, if they themselves do not take steps toward a settlement, will easily lose the political capital they have made. […] www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 74 [signature] (Ambassador)
DOCUMENT No. 10 * * * Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper #3 December 2010 [Source: Czech Foreign Ministry Archives; translated for NKIDP by Adolf Kotlik] Memo from Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the KPCZ CC Presidium "Information about the Situation in Korea" February 4, 1968 Ministry of Foreign Affa KPCZ CC Presidium and File no.: 020.873/ 68‐3 4 February 1968 Information about the situation in Korea Attachment III a/ irs, Ministry of National Defense Ministry of the Interior to the the Czechoslovak government Tension in the Far East has escalated seriously as of late in connection with the detention by the Korean People’s Army patrol boats of the American spy ship Pueblo along the DPRK coast and in connection with armed actions of Korean patriots in South Korea. These e vents have brought the situation on the Korean Peninsula to a head and have threatened to create another center of military conflict in this area. Development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula is characterized in the presented information. I. The main source and cause of persistent tension on the Korean Peninsula is the fact that Korea remains a divided country, and strong American and South Korean armies with state‐of‐the‐art weapons are positioned in the South. This circumstance has a profound influence on all life in the DPRK and is reflected in the political direction of the Korean Worker’s Party. The leadership of the KWP is following with growing anxiety the development in South Korea where younger, more flexible state leadership has been able to bring the country [back] from the brink of total collapse after the fall of Syngman Rhee and has been successful in more‐or‐less stabilizing conditions in the country with the help of foreign capital, mainly from the U.S., Japan, and West Germany. It seems that this relative stabilization of the South Korean regime, accompanied by strong anti‐communist propaganda and police terror, has paralyzed revolutionary sentiments in the country and is skillfully discrediting the authority of the DPRK and diminishing her influence among South Korean population. This is also somewhat supported lately by a more tactful behavior of U.S. troops towards the South Korean public. On the other hand, the initial political but mainly economic supremacy of the DPRK, still noticeable at the beginning of the 60’s, has been gradually eroding due to economic stagnation, characteristic of the period of close cooperation of the DPRK with the PRC (People’s Republic of China). With no less anxiety, the DPRK is following also the extensive foreign affairs and military activity of the South www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 75
Page 1 and 2:
NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTA
Page 3 and 4:
THE NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUM
Page 5 and 6:
"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim
Page 7 and 8:
Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper
Page 9 and 10:
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28: Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper
Page 49 and 50: www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 45 Mitch
Page 53 and 54: DOCUMENT APPENDIX DOCUMENT No. 1 *
Page 57 and 58: Letter from GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Page 63 and 64: www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp Mitchell
Page 65 and 66: Letter from GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Page 77: www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 73 Mitch
Page 93 and 94: On the Development of the Economy M
Page 103: www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 99 Mitch
show all

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?