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"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

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"<strong>Mostly</strong> <strong>Propag<strong>and</strong>a</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Nature</strong>:" <strong>Kim</strong> <strong>Il</strong> <strong>Sung</strong>, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Juche</strong> <strong>Ideology</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Second Korean War<br />

NKIDP Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper #3<br />

Japan relations, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ation of most of <strong>the</strong> pro-<strong>Kim</strong> underground groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> South.<br />

Fearful of fall<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> this critical competition, <strong>Kim</strong> thought it necessary to act to balance<br />

<strong>the</strong> scales. Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re are subtle differences with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> advocates of this position. Some have<br />

argued that <strong>Kim</strong> had a genu<strong>in</strong>e belief that he might spark an <strong>in</strong>digenous upris<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong><br />

Sou<strong>the</strong>rn government by reassur<strong>in</strong>g Park's domestic opponents of Nor<strong>the</strong>rn support; 19 o<strong>the</strong>rs<br />

have argued <strong>the</strong> opposite, suggest<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>Kim</strong> recognized that no such opposition movement<br />

existed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> South <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g strength of <strong>the</strong> Park regime, <strong>and</strong> that he would<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore have to <strong>in</strong>crease efforts to destabilize <strong>the</strong> government himself. 20 Still o<strong>the</strong>rs have<br />

suggested that <strong>Kim</strong> knew that he could not directly <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn political situation but<br />

thought he might discourage foreign <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> region by creat<strong>in</strong>g unstable conditions,<br />

slow<strong>in</strong>g down ROK growth while driv<strong>in</strong>g a wedge between <strong>the</strong> ROK <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir foreign<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestors. 21 O<strong>the</strong>rs have claimed that <strong>Kim</strong>'s overseas audience was not limited to <strong>the</strong> West, but<br />

that <strong>in</strong>stead he sought to show <strong>the</strong> world, particularly <strong>the</strong> Third World <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> smaller<br />

Communist states, that <strong>the</strong> North was not <strong>in</strong>timidated by Sou<strong>the</strong>rn advances <strong>and</strong> was still a<br />

power to be taken seriously. 22 Regardless of <strong>the</strong> specifics, however, this school is rooted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

idea that <strong>Kim</strong>'s paradigm shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1960s derived largely from <strong>the</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g domestic<br />

situation with<strong>in</strong> South Korea.<br />

A fifth framework shifts <strong>the</strong> focus from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational to <strong>the</strong> domestic, <strong>and</strong> suggests<br />

that <strong>in</strong>ternal conflicts were at <strong>the</strong> heart of DPRK policy. Two specific <strong>in</strong>terpretations dom<strong>in</strong>ate<br />

this school. The first focuses on<br />

<strong>the</strong> emergence of a more hard-l<strong>in</strong>e faction <strong>in</strong> DPRK politics.<br />

19<br />

Mart<strong>in</strong>, p. 127<br />

20<br />

See, for example, Charles Armstrong, Necessary Enemies," US-Korea Institute Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper Series, WP 08-03,<br />

September 2008, p. 6; Bolger, Scenes from an Unf<strong>in</strong>ished War; Balazs Szalontai, Maneuver<strong>in</strong>g Between <strong>the</strong> Battl<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Whales: North Korea’s Involvement <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Second Indoch<strong>in</strong>a War, 1964-1975, unpublished paper <strong>in</strong> author's<br />

possession.<br />

21<br />

Yong Soon Yim, "The Dynamics of North Korean Military Doctr<strong>in</strong>e," <strong>in</strong> Kwak, The Two Korea <strong>in</strong> World Politics,<br />

pp. 124-26<br />

22<br />

Wayne Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations (Praeger, 1976), p. 80.<br />

www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp<br />

8

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