"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

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NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPERS SERIES Christian F. Ostermann, Series Editor #1 Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations” #2 Bernd Schaefer, “Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy, 1971-1975” #3 Mitchell Lerner, “’Mostly Propaganda in Nature:’ Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War”
"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War The Key Question Mitchell Lerner 1 "The key question," asked the New York Times on January 28, 1968, "is why did they do it?" 2 The Times was referring to the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo in the Sea of Japan five days earlier, an event that left one American sailor dead and eighty-two others held captive in prison camps of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for almost a year. Still, the question could have been applied to North Korean behavior during much of the late 1960s, as the Pueblo attack was just one in a series of aggressive North Korean military actions during this period. Earlier in January 1968, a group of 31 DPRK soldiers crossed the DMZ on a mission to assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee, which culminated in a series of gun battles in and around Seoul. Less dramatic but equally troubling signs of increased North Korean belligerency could be found well before these two events. In 1966, military incidents along the DMZ had caused just 42 American and South Korean casualties; the first nine months of 1967 saw the number rise to almost 300. 3 Suddenly, American troops assigned to South Korea routinely found their tours of duty extended to meet the growing danger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff quietly re- classified the northern part of South Korea as a hostile fire zone, making troops stationed there 1 The author wishes to thank Bruce Cumings, James Matray, Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Jeremi Suri, and Balazs Szalontai for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper. Special thanks are due to James Person of the North Korean International Documentation Project for his advice, support, and patience throughout the process, and to the Cold War International History Project and its director, Christian Ostermann, for all of its contributions to the study of international history. 2 New York Times, January 28, 1968, p. E1. 3 The estimated number of military incidents actually vary by source, but there is no doubt that the increase was substantial. These estimates, which are actually fairly conservative, come from "Mr. Bundy's Meeting with Mr. Colby, September 15, 1967," memorandum of conversation, September 15, 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, document #127, note #3. www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
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