"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

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"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War NKIDP Working Paper #3 primary value system. Or, as the Czech Ambassador to North Korea wrote, "Instead of mobilization to accomplish work goals, all attention is focused on foreign policy issues, combat readiness and unity of Asian and African countries. We agree with our friends that with all these actions––[the] number of various mass gatherings all over the whole DPRK…and [the] mass welcomes of various delegations––the KWP is trying to distract people from pressing economic problems and to drown internal difficulties in similar actions." 74 Understanding this argument requires stepping back from the immediate crisis of the late- 1960s, and understanding what had transpired within North Korean society in the years immediately preceding it, with an eye towards determining what might have sparked Kim's pugnacious behavior. For approximately ten years after the end of the Korean War, the DPRK was generally characterized by stability in all three of the vital Juche areas. Kim seemed to turn his attention inward, focusing on rebuilding the national economy and solidifying his political control. He generally succeeded in both objectives. Politically, his rule stabilized, especially after he outmaneuvered a series of opponents at the August Party Plenum in 1956. 75 Any doubts about his control should have been vanquished by the results of the 1957 elections to the Supreme Peoples Assembly, which reported that 99.82% of the electorate supported his chosen slate of candidates. 76 By 1958 Kim's loyal supporters from the so-called Kapsan faction had consolidated their control of the KWP, the military, and the bureaucracy to such an extent that one scholar has called it part of a "second Korean revolution." 77 By 1962 Kim could truthfully tell the Soviet Ambassador, "Inside our party the situation is also good. We have now achieved firm unity and cohesion; there are no anti-party groups. In our opinion, the KWP is now cohesive and battle- 74 "On the Development of Situation in DPRK in May 1965; Political Report #8," May 27, 1965, cable from Czech Ambassador to North Korea, State Central Archive, Prague, file # (not visible/65), p. 5. [Document 1] 75 The best analysis of this critical moment in Kim's political rise is found in James Person, We Need Help from Outside': The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956, CWIHP Working Paper #52, August 2006. 76 Bon-Hak Koo, Political Economy of Self-Reliance, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1992, p. 93. 77 Barry Gills, Korea versus Korea (Routledge, 1996), pp. 59-60. www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 26
Mitchell Lerner NKIDP Working Paper #3 December 2010 ready as never before." 78 His success also appeared in the economic realm. The Five-Year Plan established in 1957 actually achieved its targets in four years. Especially significant, particularly in the sense that it offered clear signs of Juche, was the growth of local industry, which was producing an estimated 100% of the nation’s soft drinks, wine, and beer, along with over 90% of the bean paste and soy sauce. 79 And while definitive economic statistics about North Korea are obviously hard to come by, most evidence points to an impressive growth rate, significant personal wealth advances, and increased educational opportunities, all of which dwarfed the comparable rates of its Southern rival. Overall, North Korea seemed to be entering the 1960s poised for continued success. In September 1961, Kim informed the Fourth Party Conference that, "The historic revolutionary tasks of completing socialist transformation in town and country, and building the foundation of socialism have been triumphantly carried out." 80 He predicted that by the middle of the decade his people would have "A rich life, living in tile-roofed houses, eating rice and much meat, and wearing fine clothes . . . all aspects of our people's life will become bountiful, modern, and more enjoyable." 81 He also celebrated the unity of the Korean Workers Party; "Never before in the history of the Korean communist movement has the Party's ideology and organization been as strong as today," he informed Conference delegates. And he left little doubt that Juche was the glue that was holding it all together. "There have never been such close ties between the party 78 "Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung," November 14, 1962, CWIHP Virtual Archive, North Korea in the Cold War. 79 Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea (Praeger, 2001), p. 34. 80 From "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress o f the Workers Party of Korea," September 11, 1961, in Kim, On Juche in our Revolution, volume 1, p. 226. 81 From "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers Party of Korea," September 11, 1961, in Kim, On Juche in our Revolution, volume 1, p. 305-311. www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp 27
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