"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and ...

"Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War
NKIDP Working Paper #3
were constructed; leading officials and scientists were evacuated from the cities; and romantic
stories, operas, and love songs were banned, in order to ensure that the people were focused on
the threat from the West. 140 Specific battles were even invented, always with the DPRK driving
away the American imperialists; in February, Kim described a failed attack on a sentry post in
the western section of the DMZ, and in March claimed two American defeats in the same
area. 141 Other U.S. spy ships were reported to be launching raids on North Korea; one on
February 16, for example, supposedly attacked Surido before being repulsed. 142
Domestic propaganda, particularly that surrounding the Pueblo crewmen, focused on the
same message: Americans were always scheming against the North and planning to attack; only
DPRK strength and sacrifice could withstand them; and the leadership of North Korea was wise,
strong, and impressive. Overall, Kim released ninety-one Pueblo-related propaganda statements
of over three hundred words. Tellingly, none of these took the Cold War or the international
sphere as a main theme; instead, they usually had a domestic focus, with fifty-two of them
stressing the need to remain strong against future American espionage against the North. 143 One
study that analyzed all such statements concluded that they demonstrated, "an increasingly
insecure North Korean regime," and reflected "a DPRK fear of isolation, but at the same time a
strong sense of national pride used to justify a continued Stalinist political and economic
program and to insulate the country from outside influence." 144 The Pueblo men agreed. His
captors, one officer recalled, showed no interest in larger Cold War matters; "Our value to them,"
140
Memo from GDR Embassy to DPRK, March 4, 1968, to State Secretary and First Deputy of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. [Document 11]
141
State Department Korean Task Force situation report, February 18, 1968, LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories, Pueblo
Crisis, 1968, volume 7, box 29 and 30, day by day documents, part 13.
142
State Department Korean Task Force situation report, February 16, 1968, JL, NSF, NSC Histories, Pueblo Crisis,
1968, volum e 7, box 29 and 30, day by day documents, part 12.
143
Sheldon Simon, "The Pueblo Incident and the South Korean Revolution, " Asian Forum, 1970, volume 2, #3, pp.
201, 203-05.
144
Simon, "The Pueblo Incident and the South Korean Revolution," p. 212.
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