Semantics

218 BASIC SEMANTICS
Here we can see the same preposition with different meaning. Various
authors are of the idea that all different uses of prepositions are extensions
of a central, ideal containment schema where the containment schema
implies the inclusion of a geometric construct in one, two, or three
dimensional geometric construct. Lakoff et al claim that the polysemous
nature of prepositions requires a topographical approach using spatial
models.
Saeed summarizes a number of studies showing how force schemas
have been used to describe polysemy in modal verbs. Modal verbs, like
must, may and can, typically have both deontic and epistemic senses. In
the following examples we can see these modals as typically expressing
obligation, permission and ability:
a. You must hand in your essay before the end of this week.
b. You may enter the studio when the light goes off.
c. She can swim much better than me.
In these examples taken from Talmy he proposes that a typical use of
may as permission is an example of removing a barrier or keeping back
a potential but absent barrier. Sweetser also extends this analysis of may
where the normal use of may is when the barrier is a social one as in
I’ll let you smoke in the car, but just for today
The force-schema analysis also applies in the use of must for obligation
as in a. Sweetser also applies this idea when analysing the authority as a
moral or religious force, as in
You must pray three times a day
and she explains that there is a conceptual link between someone pushing
you in a direction and a moral force impelling you to act in a certain way
and that both are forces which can be resisted or acceded to. A common
conceptual schema unites the characterization of both situations. The
epistemic use of modals as metaphorical extensions of deontic uses is also
pointed out by Sweetser. For example must, in its epistemic use, expresses
a reasonable conclusion in the following expressions:
a. It’s dead. The battery must have run down.
b. You’ve travelled all day. You must be tired.
Sweetser holds that the use of modals for rational argument and
judgement are derived from their uses for the real world of social obligation
and permission and also that this derivation follows the usual metaphorical