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Conference Report 2016

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Section 1: Pay and Allowances<br />

6.4 Garda pay was underfunded in the subsequent<br />

benchmarking processes. This resulted in<br />

widespread resentment, as our members<br />

contended that they were being singled out due to<br />

an inability to strike or to take limited industrial<br />

action. This was the discriminatory treatment meted<br />

out to this Association by being effectively and<br />

persistently sidelined from the social partnership,<br />

pay talks and negotiation process. The experience<br />

of being corralled into a side room and presented<br />

with an agreed deal (concluded with the ICTUaffiliated<br />

unions in an adjoining room) was neither<br />

edifying nor equitable. As a result this Association<br />

repeatedly refused to sign-off on such deals.<br />

6.5 The industrial relations temperature in An Garda<br />

Síochána was increased in 2005, through the Garda<br />

Síochána Act. Under Section 59 it is held that:<br />

“a person is guilty of an offence if he or she induces,<br />

or does any act calculated to induce, any member of<br />

the Garda Síochána to withhold his or her services<br />

or to commit a breach of discipline”.<br />

6.6 We also had the breakdown of pay talks in 2009<br />

that led to the GRA surveying members for industrial<br />

action leading to the Croke Park Agreement in 2010;<br />

subsequently the placard protests and Tallaght<br />

‘Basketball Stadium” Rally that undermined the<br />

attempted Croke Park II and resulted in Haddington<br />

Road Agreement. Let us be reminded that this<br />

Review is part of that dispute resolution, and yet<br />

government pushed ahead with the Lansdowne<br />

Road Agreement before this aspect had been<br />

addressed.<br />

6.7 At the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)<br />

conference in 2004 delegates voted in favour of an<br />

amendment to their constitution, enabling the Garda<br />

(and Defence Forces) associations to become<br />

associate members of Congress. However,<br />

subsequent initiatives endeavoured to ensure that<br />

representative bodies in An Garda Síochána would<br />

be forbidden from formal ongoing affiliations with<br />

trade unions (i.e. non-membership of ICTU). Section<br />

18(2) of the 2005 Garda Síochána Act states:<br />

“An association established under subsection (1)<br />

must be independent of and not associated with<br />

any body or person outside the Garda Síochána, but<br />

it may employ persons who are not members of the<br />

Garda Síochána.”<br />

6.8 Serving to further tighten the restrictions on this<br />

Association, Section 18(4) of the Act states that:<br />

“...if a question arises whether any body or<br />

association is a trade union or association referred<br />

to in subsection (3), the question shall be<br />

determined by the Minister whose determination<br />

shall be final.”<br />

6.9 In 2009 the relevance of this enactment surfaced<br />

when this Association’s Central Executive<br />

Committee, in frustration at their ongoing exclusion<br />

from the key national decision making forum and<br />

processes, considered the possibility of balloting<br />

the membership on a menu of industrial action<br />

options. This raised a range of possibilities,<br />

including the spectre of the Association’s<br />

leadership being prosecuted or imprisoned.<br />

6.10 A consequential development in the industrial<br />

relations system in An Garda Síochána has been<br />

from the European Committee of Social Rights,<br />

operating under the auspices of the Council of<br />

Europe. Like the European Court of Human Rights,<br />

which is also part of the Council of Europe, the<br />

Committee’s rulings are binding in law. Decisions of<br />

the Committee are final and legally binding and do<br />

not have to be endorsed by any other body. Courts<br />

can declare invalid or set aside domestic legislation<br />

if it is contrary to a decision of the Committee (e.g.<br />

the Garda Síochána Act 2005).<br />

6.11 The complaint brought was that the Irish<br />

Government had violated certain elements of the<br />

European Social Charter, which it had signed up to<br />

(in November 2000) and focused on the fact that<br />

representative bodies in An Garda Síochána:<br />

“...do not enjoy full trade union rights, which include,<br />

in particular, the right to join an umbrella<br />

organisation and the right to bargain collectively”.<br />

6.12 Specifically it was contended that existing<br />

provisions violate Articles 5 (the right to organise), 6<br />

(the right to bargain collectively) and 21 (the right to<br />

information and consultation) of the European<br />

Social Charter. The charter provides:<br />

(a) Join the ICTU<br />

(b) Access the services of the LRC<br />

(c) Take collective industrial action.<br />

6.13 Notably, the Committee’s findings weighed heavily<br />

in favour of gardaí. The GRA sees both scope and<br />

merit in enabling its access to the State’s third party<br />

dispute resolution mechanisms.<br />

38th Annual Delegate <strong>Conference</strong><br />

41

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