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Conference Report 2016

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Section 1: Pay and Allowances<br />

WRC and the Labour Court and advises that the<br />

appropriate primary legislation be enacted.<br />

6.27 It is now an affront to any group of workers that<br />

such a basic entitlement is denied. This demand is<br />

discrete from those pertaining to trade union status,<br />

the right to strike or any other consideration to the<br />

Association’s membership’s welfare. The denial to<br />

employees of the State’s all-important security<br />

services of such a basic entitlement is no longer<br />

acceptable.<br />

6.28 There has traditionally been a reluctance to have<br />

Garda bodies engage in the same fora as trade<br />

unions. However, for the first time in its history, the<br />

GRA was recently granted (apparently on a once-off<br />

basis), to be involved directly in negotiations on<br />

members’ pay and conditions of employment. This<br />

welcome precedent proved to be a beneficial<br />

development and to be in the best interests of all<br />

parties to the process.<br />

6.29 The relevance of appropriate fora or independence<br />

of the treatment of such matters also recently<br />

featured under the HRA, wherein one of the key<br />

inducing planks for gardaí was the commitment to<br />

this Review process. However, the Department of<br />

Justice’s endeavours to impose the wholly<br />

inappropriate Garda Síochána Inspectorate as<br />

opposed to an independent chairperson of the<br />

Review came close to sundering the complete<br />

sectoral agreement.<br />

6.30 It is common practice to look to our counterparts in<br />

Great Britain and Northern Ireland when addressing<br />

issues, including police pay. Notably these<br />

counterparts are entitled to directly negotiate their<br />

pay and conditions of service with their employers<br />

in the Home Office, via the Joint Police Negotiating<br />

Board (PNB). Prior to 1919 each police force<br />

determined pay for police officers on a local basis. In<br />

1919 a police strike forced the government of the<br />

day to ban strikes, but in so doing they were also<br />

forced to find a way to determine pay and<br />

conditions that would be acceptable to the police<br />

and the public. Hence, from 1919 to 1980 a Whitley<br />

Council approach was adopted.<br />

6.31 The Whitley or Police Council approach operated for<br />

over 50 years with a number of discrete<br />

independent reviews complementing the Council’s<br />

operations. Following the Police Federation’s<br />

withdrawal from the Council (alongside a dispute<br />

over police pay in 1976-77) an Inquiry into the<br />

industrial relations or police negotiating machinery<br />

was established in 1978.<br />

6.32 This recommended the establishment of the PNB in<br />

its present form, with a chairperson and deputy<br />

independent from both sides. The role of the chair<br />

was to “provide continuity and to supply a neutral<br />

voice in negotiation”. An independent secretariat<br />

was also introduced to provide knowledge and<br />

expertise. Specifically addressing the relationship<br />

between the machinery of negotiation and the<br />

absence of the right to strike this (Edmund-Davies)<br />

Inquiry pointed out that:<br />

“Such an important limitation on the freedom of<br />

action of members of the police force renders it<br />

even more essential that the machinery for<br />

determining police pay and other conditions of<br />

service commands the confidence of all sections of<br />

the service.”<br />

6.33 The Police Negotiating Board Act 1980 formally<br />

established the PNB, and was subsequently<br />

consolidated via the Police Act 1996. At the heart of<br />

the Inquiry was the proposed indexing of police<br />

officers’ pay to movements in the Average Earnings<br />

Index for the whole economy.<br />

6.34 In 1993 a further significant development arose<br />

when the Sheehy Inquiry (into Police<br />

Responsibilities and Rewards) recommended a link<br />

to pay settlements rather than average earnings.<br />

Subsequently, the median of total pay settlements<br />

was used to determine the annual police pay rise.<br />

6.35 In 2007-8 there was an unusually vocal and<br />

demonstrative response by the Police Federation of<br />

England and Wales (PFEW) to the decision by the<br />

then Home Secretary to phase in the recommended<br />

pay increases. An estimated 22,500 police officers<br />

marched in central London in protest in an era of<br />

considerable friction between Government and the<br />

PFEW. In August 2008 the Federation was obliged to<br />

call on its 140,000 members to adopt a de facto<br />

‘work-to-rule’ after talks broke down in a bitter pay<br />

row, in response to the Government’s argument<br />

that the automatic indexed pay award system<br />

removed incentives for workplace reform.<br />

6.36 In an attempt to address the issue of police pay<br />

determination in 2010 the government<br />

commissioned the Winsor <strong>Report</strong>. This endorsed the<br />

operation of an independent Police Pay Review<br />

Body to replace the PNB According to Winsor’s<br />

assessment, the experience from other parts of the<br />

British public sector had shown that a pay review<br />

body is capable of respecting the unique status of<br />

certain employee groups in a society that denies<br />

them a right to strike (such as the Armed Forces’<br />

Pay Review Body).<br />

38th Annual Delegate <strong>Conference</strong><br />

43

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